And mass communication, the communication that potentially reaches society at large, is shaped and managed by power relationships, rooted in the business of media and the politics of the state. Communication power is as the heart of the structure and dynamics of society. (p. 3)

This is the subject matters of this book. Why, how, and by whom power relationships are constructed and exercised through the management of communication processes, and how these power relationships can be altered by social actors aiming for social change by influencing the public mind. **My working hypothesis is that the most fundamental form of power lies in the ability to shape the human mind. The way we feel and think determines the way we act, both individually and collectively. Yes, coercion, and the capacity to exercise it, legitimate or not, is an essential source of power. But coercion alone cannot stabilize domination. The ability to build consent, or at least to instill fear and resignation vis-à-vis the existing order, is essential to enforce the rules that govern the institutions and organizations of society. And these rules, in all societies, manifest power relationships embedded in the institutions as a result of processes of struggle and compromise between conflicting social actors who mobilize for their interests under the banner of their values. Furthermore, the process of institutionalizing norms and rules and the challenge to these norms and rules by actors who do not feel adequately represented in the workings of the system go on simultaneously, in a relentless movement of reproduction of society and production of social change. If the fundamental battle about the definition of the norms of society, and the application to these norms in everyday life, revolves around the shaping of the human mind, communications is central to this battle. Because it is through communication that the human mind interacts with its social and natural environments. This process of communication operates according to the structure, culture, organization, and technology of communication in a given society. The communication process decisively mediates the way in which power relationships are constructed and challenged in every domain of social practice, including political practice. (p. 3)

My purpose, ambitious enough, is to propose a new approach to understanding power in the network society. And, as a necessary step toward this goal, to specify the structure and dynamics of communication in our historical context. To advance the construction of a grounded theory of power in the network society (which, for me, is tantamount to a theory of communication power), I will focus my effort on studying the current processes of asserting political power and counterpower, by using available scholarly research on the matter, and conducting a number of case studies in a diversity of social and cultural contexts. However, we know that political power is only one dimension of power, as power relationships are constructed in a complex interaction between multiple spheres of social practice. And so, my empirical analysis will be necessarily incomplete, although I hope to
stimulate a similar analytical perspective for the study of power in other dimensions, such as culture, technology, finance, production, or consumption. (p. 5)

After establishing the conceptual foundations of the analysis of power, I proceed, in Chapter 2, with a similar analytical operation concerning communication. Yet, when it comes to communication, I go further by empirically investigating the structure and dynamics of mass communication under the conditions of globalization and digitalization. I analyze both the mass media and the horizontal networks of interactive communication, focusing on both their differences and their intersections. I study the transformation of the media audience from the receptors of messages to senders/receivers of messages, and I explore the relationship between this transformation and process of cultural change in our world. Finally, I identify the power relationships embedded in the mass-communication system and in the network infrastructure on which communication depends, and I explore the connections between business, media, and politics. (p. 6)

Having set up the structural determinants of the relationship between power and communication in the network society, I change the perspective of my analysis from the structure to the agency. If power works by acting on the human mind by means of communicating messages, we need to understand how the human mind processes these messages, and how this processing translates into the political realm. (p. 7)

Resumindo, Castells, no decorrer dos capítulos mostra a relação inextricável de três componentes:

- The structural determinants of social and political power in the global network society.
- The structural determinants of the process of mass communication under the organizational, cultural, and technological conditions of our time.
- The cognitive processing of the signals presented by the communication system to the human mind as it relates to politically relevant social practice. (p. 8)

Chapter 4 will explain and document why, in the network society, politics is fundamentally media politics, focusing on its epitome, the politics of scandal, and relating the results of the analysis to the worldwide crisis of political legitimacy that challenges the meaning of democracy in much of the world. Chapter 5 explores how social movements and agents of political change proceed in our society through the reprogramming of communication networks, so becoming able to convey messages that introduce new values to the minds of people and inspire hope for political change. (p. 8)

Yet, my assumption, which will be tested, is that the greater the autonomy provided to the users by the technologies of communication, the greater the chances that new values and new interests will enter the realm of socialized communication, so reaching the public mind. (p. 8)

Power is the most fundamental process in society, since society is defined around values and institutions, and what is valued and institutionalized is defined by power relationships. (p. 10)
Power is exercised by means of coercion (or the possibility of it) and/or by the constructions of meaning on the basis of the discourses through which social actors guide their action. (p. 10)

The concept of actor refers to a variety of subjects of action, collective actors, organizations, institutions, and networks. Ultimately, however, all organizations, institutions and networks express the action of human actors, even if this action has been institutionalized or organized by processes in the past. (p. 10)

Relational capacity means that the power is not an attribute but a relationship between the subjects of power, those who are empowered and those who are subjected to such empowerment in a given context. Asymmetrically means that while influence in a relationship is always reciprocal, in power relationship there is always a greater degree of influence of one actor over the other. (p. 11)

This is why the process of legitimation, the core of Habermas’s political theory, is the key to enable the state to stabilize the exercise of its domination (Habermas, 1976). (p. 12)

Thus, power is not located in one particular social sphere or institution, but it is distributed throughout the entire realm of human action. Yet, there are concentrated expressions of power relationship in certain social forms that condition and frame the practice of power in society at large by enforcing domination. Power is relational, domination is institutional. A particularly relevant form of domination, throughout history, the state in its different manifestations (Poulantzas, 1978; Mulgan, 2007). But states are historical entities (Tilly, 1974). Therefore, the amount of power they hold depends on the overall social structure in which they operate. And this is the most decisive question in understanding the relationship between power and the state. (p. 15)

In other words, disciplinary discourses are backed up by the potential use of violence, and state violence is rationalized, internalized, and ultimately legitimized by the discourses that frame/shape human action (Clegg, 2000). Indeed, the institutions and para-institutions of the state (for example, religious institutions, universities, the learned elites, the media to some extent) are the main sources of these discourses. (p. 16)

Geoff Mulgan has theorized the capacity of the state to assume and exercise power through the articulation of three sources of power: violence, money, and trust. (p. 16)

The three sources of power together underpin political power, the sovereign power to impose laws, issue commands and hold together a people and a territory... It concentrates force through its armies, concentrate resources through exchequers, and concentrates power to shape minds, most recently through big systems of education and communication that are the twin glues of modern nation states... Of the three sources of power the most important for sovereignty is the power over the thoughts that give rise to trust. Violence can only be use negatively; money can only be used in two dimensions, giving and taking away. But knowledge and thoughts can transform things, move mountains and make ephemeral power appear permanent. (Mulgan, 2007; 27) (p. 16)
However, the modes of existence of the state and its capacity to act on power relationships depend on the specifics of the social structure in which the state operates. Indeed, the very notions of the state and society depend on the boundaries that define their existence in a given historical context. And our historical context is marked by the contemporary processes of globalization and the rise of the network society, both relying on communication networks that process knowledge and thoughts to make and unmake trust, the decisive source of power. (p. 16)

Globalization, when taken to its logical conclusion, means that the social sciences must be grounded anew as a reality-based science of the transnational – conceptually, theoretically, methodologically, and organizationally as well. This includes the fact that there is a need for the basic concepts of “modern society” – household, family, class, democracy, domination, state, economy, the public sphere, politics and so on – to be released from the fixations of methodological nationalism and redefined and reconceptualized in the context of methodological cosmopolitanism. (Beck, 2005:50) (p. 17)

In sum: if power relationships exist in specific social structures that are constituted on the basis of spatiotemporal formations, and these spatiotemporal formations are no longer primarily located at the national level, but are global and local at the same time, the boundary of society changes, and so does the frame of reference of power relationships that transcend the national (Fraser, 2007). This is not to say that the nation-state disappears. But it is to say that the national boundaries of power relationships are just one of the dimensions in which power and counterpower operate. Ultimately, this affects the nation-state itself. Even if it does not fade away as a specific form of social organization, it changes its role, its structure, and its functions, gradually evolving toward a new form of state: the network state that I analyze below. (p. 18)

How, in this context, can we understand power relationships that are not primarily defined within the territorial boundaries established by the state? (p. 18)

Thus, the social dynamics constructed around networks appears to dissolve society as a stable social form of organization. However, a more constructive approach of to the understanding of the process of historical change is to conceptualize a new form of society, the network society, made up of specific configurations of global, national, and local networks in a multidimensional space of social interaction. I hypothesize that relatively stable configurations built on the intersections of these networks may provide the boundaries that could redefine a new “society,” with the understanding that these boundaries are highly volatile because of the relentless change in the geometry of the global networks that structure social practices and organizations. (p. 19)

Nodes only exist and function as components of networks. The network is the unit, not the node. (p. 20)

So, networks process flows. Flows are streams of information between nodes, circulating through the channels of connections between nodes. (p. 20)
Networks (and the sets of interests and values they embody) cooperate or compete with each other. Cooperation is based on the ability to communicate between networks. This ability depends on the existence of codes of translation and inter-operability between the networks (protocols of communication) and on access to connecting points (switches). (p. 20)

Thus, networks are complex structures of communication constructed around a set of goals that simultaneously ensure unity of purpose and flexibility of execution by their adaptability to the operating environment. They are programmed and self-configurable at the same time. Their goals and operating procedures are programmed, in social and organizational networks, by social actors. Their structure evolves according to the capacity of the network to self-configure in an endless search for more efficient networking arrangements. (p. 21)

Networks are not specific to twenty-first-century societies or, for that matter, to human organization (Buchanan, 2002). Networks constitute the fundamental pattern of life, of all kinds of life. As Fritjof Capra writes, “the network is a pattern that is common to all life. Wherever we see life, we see networks” (2002: 9). In social life, social network analysts have long investigated the dynamic of social networks at the heart of social interaction and the production of meaning (Burt, 1980), leading to the formulation of a systematic theory of communication networks (Monge and Contractor, 2003). Furthermore, in terms of social structure, archeologists and historians of antiquity have forcefully reminded us that the historical record shows the pervasiveness and relevance of networks as the backbone of societies, thousands of years ago, in the most advanced ancient civilizations in several regions of the planet. Indeed, if we transfer the notion of globalization into the geography of the ancient world, as determined by available transportation technologies, there was networked globalization of a sort in antiquity, as societies depended on the connectivity of their livelihood, resources, and power (LaBianca, 2006). Muslim culture has been historically based on global networks (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005). And McNeill and McNeill (2003) have demonstrated the critical role of networks in social organization throughout history. (p. 21)

Se as redes sempre existiram, por que há uma superioridade histórica das organizações verticais e hierarquizadas sobre as horizontais definidas por redes?

My hypothesis to explain the historical superiority of vertical/hierarchical organizations over horizontal networks is that the non-centered networked form of social organization had material limits to overcome, limits that were fundamentally linked to available technologies. Indeed, networks have their strength in their flexibility, adaptability, and capacity to self-reconfigure. Yet, beyond a certain threshold of size, complexity, and volume of flows, they become less efficient than vertically organized command-and-control structures, under the conditions of pre-electronic communication technologies (Mokyr, 1990). Yes, wind-powered vessels could build sea-crossing and even trans-oceanic networks of trade and conquest. And horse-riding emissaries and fast-running messengers could maintain communication from the center to periphery of vast territorial empires. But the time-lag of the feedback loop in the communication process was such that the logic of the system amounted to a one-way flow of the transmission of information and instruction. Under such conditions, networks were and extension of power concentrated at the top of the vertical organizations that
shaped the history of humankind: state, religious apparatuses, war lords, armies, bureaucracies, and their subordinates in charge of production, trade, and culture. (p. 22)

The ability of networks to introduce new actors and new contents in the process of social organization, with relative autonomy vis-à-vis the power centers, increased over time with technological change and, more precisely, with the evolution of communication technologies. This was particularly the case with the possibility of relying on a distributed energy network that characterized the advent of the industrial revolution (Hughes, 1983). Railways and telegraph constituted the first infrastructure for a quasi-global network of communication with self-reconfiguring capacity (Beniger, 1986). However, the industrial society (both in its capitalist and its statist versions) was predominantly structured around large-scale, vertical production organizations and extremely hierarchical state institutions, in some instances evolving into totalitarian systems. This is to say that early, electrically based communication technologies were not powerful enough to equip networks with autonomy in all their nodes, as this autonomy would have required multidirectionality and a continuous flow of interactive information processing. But it also means that the availability of proper technology is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the transformation of social structure. It was only under the conditions of a mature industrial society that autonomous projects of organizational networking could emerge. When they did, they could use the potential of micro-electronic-based digital communication technologies (Benkler, 2006) (p. 22)

Thus, networks became the most efficient organizational forms as a result of three major features of networks which benefited from the new technological environment: flexibility, scalability, and survivability. Flexibility is the ability to reconfigure according to changing environments and retain their goals while changing their components, sometimes bypassing blocking points of communication channels to find new connections. Scalability is the ability to expand or shrink in size with little disruption. Survivability is the ability of networks, because they have no single center and can operate in a wide range of configurations, to withstand attacks to their nodes and codes because the codes of the network are contained in multiple nodes that can reproduce the instructions and find new ways to perform. So, only the material ability to destroy the connecting points can eliminate the network. (p. 23)

All the core of this technological change that unleashed the power of networks was the transformation of information and communication technologies, based on the microelectronics revolution that took shape in the 1950s and 1960s (Freeman, 1982; Perez, 1983). It constituted the foundation of a new technological paradigm, consolidated in the 1970s, first in the United States, and rapidly diffused around the world, ushering in what I have characterized as the Informational Age (Castells, 2000a, c, 2004c). (p. 23)

The contemporary process of globalization has its origin in economic, political, and cultural factors, as documented by scholarly analyses of globalization (Beck, 2000; Held and McGrew, 2000, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002). But, as a number of studies have indicated, the forces driving globalization could only be effectuated because they have at their disposal the global networking capacity provided by digital communication technologies and information systems,
including computerized, long-haul, fast, transportation networks (Kiyoshi et al., 2006; Grewal, 2008). This is, in fact, what separates, in size, speed, and complexity, the current process of globalization from previous forms of globalization in earlier historical periods. (p. 24)

Thus, the network society is a global society. However, this does not mean that people everywhere are included in these networks. For the time being, most are not (Hammond et al., 2007). But everybody is affected by the processes that take place in the global networks that constitute the social structure. The core activities that shape and control human life in every corner of the planet are organized in global networks: financial markets; transnational production, management, and the distribution of good and services; highly skilled labor. Science and technology, including higher education; the mass media; the Internet networks of interactive, multipurpose communication; culture; art; entertainment; sports; international institutions managing the global economy and intergovernmental relations; religion; the criminal economy; and the transnational NGOs and social movements that assert the rights and values of a new, global civil society (Held et al., 1999; Volkmer, 1999; Castells, 2000a; Jacquet et al., 2002; Stiglitz, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Grewal, 2008; Juris, 2008).

In sum: the old question of industrial society – indeed, the cornerstone of classical political economy – namely, “what is value?”, has no definite answer in the global network society. Value is what is processed in every dominant network at every time in every space according to the hierarchy programmed in the network by the actors acting upon the network. Capitalism has not disappeared. Indeed, it is more pervasive than ever. But it is not, against a common ideological perception, the only game in the global town. (p. 29)

The most fundamental divide in the network society, albeit not the only one, is between self-programmable labor and generic labor (Castells, 2000; Castells, 2000c; Benner, 2002). (p. 30)

This specific division of labor is gendered. The rise of flexible labor is directly related to the feminization of the paid labor force, a fundamental trend of the social structure in the past three decades (Carnoy, 2000). (…) Thus, women have become the ideal workers of the networked, global, capitalist economy: on one hand, they are able to work efficiently, and adapt to the changing requirements of business; on the other hand, they receive less compensation for the same work, and have fewer chances for promotion because of the ideology and practice of the gendered division of labor under patriarchalism. (p. 30)

Indeed, the fundamental reason for the structural need for flexibility and autonomy is the transformation of the organization of the production process. This transformation is represented by the rise of the network enterprise. This new organizational business form is the historical equivalent under informationalism of the so-called Fordist organization of industrialism (both capitalist and statist), which is the organization characterized by high-volume, standardized, mass production and vertical control of the labor process according to a top-down, rationalized scheme (“scientific management” and Taylorism, the methods that prompted Lenin’s admiration, leading to their imitation in the Soviet Union). Although there are still millions of workers in similarly run factories, the value-producing activities in the commanding heights of the production process (R&D, innovation, design, marketing,
management, and high-volume, customized, flexible production) depend on an entirely
different type of firm and, therefore, a different type of work process and of labor: the
network enterprise. This is not the equivalent of a network of enterprises. It is a network
made from either firms or segments of firms, and/or from the internal segmentation of firms.
Thus, large corporations are internally decentralized as networks. Small and medium
businesses are connected in networks, thus ensuring the critical mass of their contribution as
subcontractors, while keeping their main asset: flexibility. Small and medium business
networks are often ancillary to large corporations; in most cases to several of them. Large
corporations, and their subsidiary networks, usually form networks of cooperation, called, in
business practice, strategic alliances or partnerships. (p. 31)

The firm continues to be the legal unit of capital accumulation. But, since the value of the
firm ultimately depends on its financial valuation in the stock market, the unit of capital
accumulation, the firm, becomes itself a node in a global network of financial flows. Thus, in
the network economy, the dominant layer is the global financial market, the mother of all
valuations. The global financial market works only partly according to market rules. It is also
shaped and moved by information turbulences of various origins, processed and
communicated by the computer networks the constitute the nerve system of global,
informational, capitalist economy (Hutton and Giddens, 2000; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004;
Zallom, 2006). (p. 32)

Resumo da empresa em rede e da nova divisão social do trabalho:

The new economy of our time is certainly capitalist, but of a new brand of capitalism: it
depends on innovation as the source of productivity growth; on computer-networked global
financial markets, whose criteria for valuation are influenced by information turbulences; on
the networking of production and management, both internally and externally, locally and
globally; and on labor that is flexible and adaptable. The creators of value have to be self-
programmable and able to autonomously process information into specific knowledge.
Generic workers, reduce their role as executants, must be ready to adapt to the needs of the
network enterprise, or else face displacement by machines or alternative labor forces. (p. 33)

Segmentação dos trabalhadores entre:

- Aqueles que são inovadores (mão-de-obra flexível e auto programável);
- Aqueles que são meros seguidores de instruções (mão-de-obra genérica);
- Aqueles que são irrelevantes para o lucro

As all historical transformations, the emergence of a new social structure is linked to the
redefinition of the material foundations of our existence, space and time, (…) (p. 33)

Two emergent social forms of time and space characterize the network society, while
coexisting with prior forms. These are the space of flows and timeless time. (p. 34)
Most dominant functions in the network society (financial markets, transnational production networks, media networks, networked forms of global governance, global social movements) are organized around the space of flows. (p. 34)

Social time was shaped throughout history by what I call bureaucratic time, which is the organization of time, in institutions and in everyday life, by the codes of military-ideological apparatuses, imposed over the rhythms of biological time. In the industrial age, clock time gradually emerged, inducing what I would call, in the Foucauldian tradition, disciplinary time. (p. 34)

Thus, what characterizes the global network society is the contraposition between the logic of the global net and the affirmation of a multiplicity of local selves, as I have tried to argue and document in my work (Castells, 2000a, c, 2004c; see also Tilly, 2005) (p. 37)

Rather than the rise of a homogeneous global culture, what we observe is historical cultural diversity as the main common trend: fragmentation rather than convergence. (p. 37)

Otherwise, the sharing of an interdependent, global social structure, while not being able to speak a common language of values and beliefs, leads to systemic misunderstanding, at the root of destructive violence against the other. Thus, protocols of communication between different cultures are the critical issue for the network society, since without them there is no society, just dominant networks and resisting communes. The project of a cosmopolitan culture common to the citizens of the world lays the foundation for democratic global governance and addresses the central cultural-institutional issue of the network society (Habermas, 1998; Beck, 2005). Unfortunately, this vision proposes the solution without identifying, other than in normative terms, the processes by which these protocols of communication are to be created or could be created, given the fact that cosmopolitan culture, according to empirical research, is present only in a very small part of the population, including in Europe (Norris, 2000; European Commission's Eurobarometer, 2007, 2008). Thus, while personally wishing that the culture of cosmopolitanism would gradually increase communication between peoples and cultures, observation of current trends points in a different direction. (p. 37)

(...hypothesis: the common culture of the global network society is a culture of protocols of communication enabling communication between different cultures on the basis not of shared values but of the sharing of the value of communication. (p. 38)

The culture of the network society is a culture of protocols of communication between all cultures in the world, developed on the basis of the common belief in the power of networking and of the synergy obtained by giving to others and receiving from others. (p. 38)

The emerging network state is characterized by shared sovereignty and responsibility between different states and levels of governments; flexibility of governance procedures; and greater diversity of times and spaces in the relationship between governments and citizens compared to the preceding nation-state. (p. 40)

Indeed, the world is objectively multilateral but some of the most powerful political actors in the international scene (for example, the United States, Russia, or China) tend to act
unilaterally, putting their national interest first without concern for the destabilization of the world at large. So doing, they jeopardize their own security as well, because their unilateral actions in the context of a globally interdependent world induce systemic chaos (for example, the connection between the Iraq War, tensions with Iran, the intensification of war in Afghanistan, the rise of oil prices, and the global economic downturn). As long as these geopolitical contradictions persist, the world cannot shift from a pragmatic, ad hoc networking form of negotiated decision-making to a system of constitutionally founded, networked, global governance. (p. 41)

Ad hoc: para este objetivo ou finalidade específica. Algo ad hoc, é algo com finalidade específica.

Standards (protocols of communication) (p. 43)

The sources of social power in our world — violence and discourse, coercion and persuasion, political domination and cultural framing — have not changed fundamentally from our historical experience, as theorized by some of the leading thinkers on power. But the terrain where power relationships operate has changed in two major ways: it is primarily constructed around the articulation between the global and the local; and it is primarily organized around networks, not single units. Because networks are multiple, power relationships are specific to each network. But there is a fundamental form of exercising power that is common to all networks: exclusion from the network. This is also specific to each network: a person, or group, or territory can be excluded from one network but included in others. However, because the key, strategic networks are global, there is one form of exclusion — thus, of power — that is pervasive in a world of networks: to include everything valuable in the global while excluding the devalued local. There as citizens of the world, living in the space of flows, versus the locals, living in the space of places. Because space in the network society is configured around the opposition between the space of flows (global) and the space of places (local), the spatial structure of our society is a major source of structuration of power relationships. (p. 50)

Thus, switching and programming the global networks are the forms of exercising power in our global network society. Switching is enacted by switchers; programming is accomplished by programmers. Who the switchers are and who the programmers are in each network is specific to the network and cannot be determined without investigating in each particular case. (p. 52)

Resisting programming and disrupting switching in order to defend alternative values and interests are the forms of counterpower enacted by social movements and civil society — local, national, and global — with the difficulty that the networks of power are usually global, while the resistance of counterpower is usually local. How to reach the global from the local, through networking with other localities — how to “grassroot” the space of flows — becomes the key strategic question for the social movements of our age. (p. 52)

The specific means of switching and programming largely determine the forms of power and counterpower in the network society. Switching different networks requires the ability to construct a cultural and organizational interface, a common language, a common medium, a
support of universally accepted value: exchange value. In our world, the typical, all-purpose form of exchange value is money. It is through this common currency that power-sharing is most often measured between different networks. This standard of measurement is essential because it removes the decisive role of the state, since the appropriation of value by all networks becomes dependent on financial transactions. This does not mean that capitalists control everything. It simply means that whoever has enough money, including political leaders, will have a better chance of operating the switch in its favor. But, as in the capitalist economy, besides monetized transactions, barter can also be used: an exchange of services between networks (for example, regulatory power in exchange for political funding from business, or leveraging media access for political influence). So, switching power depends on the capacity to generate exchange value, be it through money or through barter (troca). (p. 52)

There is a second major source of power: networks’ programming capacity. This capacity ultimately depends on the ability to generate, diffuse, and affect the discourses that frame human action. Without this discursive capacity, the programming of specific networks is fragile, and depends solely on the power of the actors entrenched in the institutions. Discourses, in our society, shape the public mind via one specific technology: communication networks that organize socialized communication. Because the public mind – that is, the set of values and frames that have broad exposure in society – is ultimately what influences individual and collective behavior, programming the communication networks is the decisive source of cultural materials that feed the programmed goals of any other network. Furthermore, because communication networks connect the local with the global, the codes diffused in these networks have a global reach. (p. 53)

Alternative projects and values put forward by the social actors aiming to reprogram society must also go through the communication networks to transform consciousness and views in people’s minds in order to challenge the power that be. And it is only by acting on global discourses through the global communication networks that they can affect power relationships in the global networks that structure all societies. In the last resort, the power of programming conditions switching power because the programs of the networks determine the range of possible interfaces in the switching process. Discourses frame the options of what networks can or cannot do. In the network society, discourses are generated, diffused, fought over, internalized, and ultimately embodied in human action, in the socialized communication realm constructed around local-global networks of multimodal, digital communication, including the media and the Internet. Power in the network society is communication power. (p. 53)

Communication is the sharing of meaning through the exchange of information. The process of communication is defined by the technology of communication, the characteristics of the senders and receivers of information, their cultural codes of reference and protocols of communication, and the scope of the communication process. Meaning can only be understood in the context of the social relationships in which information and communication are processed (Schiller, 2007: 18). (p. 54)
Yet, mass communication used to be predominantly one-directional. However, with the diffusion of the Internet, a new form of interactive communication has emerged, characterized by the capacity of sending messages from many to many, in real time or chosen time, and with the possibility of using point-to-point communication, narrowcasting or broadcasting, depending on the purpose and characteristics of the intended communication practice. (p. 55)

I call this historically new form of communication mass self-communication. It is mass communication because it can potentially reach a global audience, as in the posting of a video on YouTube, a blog with RSS links to a number of web sources, or a message to a massive e-mail list. At the same time, it is self-communication because the production of the message is self-generated, the definition of the potential receiver(s) is self-directed, and the retrieval of specific messages or content from the World Wide Web and electronic communication networks is self-selected. (p. 55)

Indeed, the most important dimension of communication convergence, as Jenkins writes, “occurs within the brains of individual consumers and through their social interaction with others” (2006: 3).

Freedom of expression and communication on the Internet and in the global/local multimedia system is often curtailed and surveilled by government bureaucracies, political elites, and ideological/religious apparatuses. Privacy is long forgone in a flurry of “cookies” and personal data-retrieving strategies, with the partial exception of those users with high level of technical sophistication (Whitaker, 1999; Solove, 2004). (p. 57)

Yet, at the same time, social actors and individual citizens around the world are using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to defend their interests, and to assert their values (Downing, 2003; Juris, 2008; Costanza-Chock, forthcoming a). Furthermore, they have become increasingly aware of the crucial role of the new multimedia system and its regulatory institutions in the culture and politics of society. Thus, we are witnessing in some areas of the world, and particularly in the United States, social and political mobilizations aiming to establish a degree of citizen control over the controllers of communication and assert their right to freedom in the communication space (Couldry and Curran, 2003; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2007, 2008). (p. 57)

Point-to-point communication: post, telephone and telegraph, and mass communications, such as the press, radio and television. (p. 58)

The trend identified in 1983 by Ithiel de Sola Pool’s pioneering work is now a reality that has redesigned the communication landscape. It is hardly surprising that the emergence in the 1970s of a new technological paradigm based on information and communication technologies would have a decisive influence in the realm of communication (Freeman, 1982; Perez, 1983; Castells, 2000c; Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000; Wilson, 2004). From the technological point of view, telecommunication networks, computer networks, and broadcasting networks converged on the basis of digital networking and new data transmission and storage technologies, particularly optic fiber, satellite communication, and advanced software (Cowhey and Aronson, 2009). (p. 58)
What has changed is television’s fragmentation into multiple channels, often targeted to specific audiences, in a practice of narrowcasting that tends to increase cultural differentiation in the mass media world (Turrow, 2005). Furthermore, the practice of digital video recording and computerized programming of television viewing, with the introduction of devices such as TIVO, has individualized and customized the reception of programming. So, television remains a mass communication medium from the perspective of the sender, but it is often a personal communication medium from the point of view of the receiver. The growing capacity to control the reception of television includes software able to program recordings and skip advertising, a fundamental threat to main source of revenue for television broadcasting. (p. 60)

Thus, although television is still the dominant medium of mass communication, it has been profoundly transformed by technology, business, and culture, to the point that it can now be better understood as a medium that combines mass broadcasting with mass narrowcasting. (p. 60)

According to Nielsen Media Research, by 2006 more than 85 percent of US households had utilized cable or satellite television, up from 56 percent in 1990. The primetime audience for broadcast television (8-11 p.m.) fell from 80 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 2006 (Standard and Poor, 2007a). (p. 60)

However, while the new technological infrastructure and the development of cable and satellite broadcasting increased product customization and targeted segmentation of the audience, the vertical integration of local television stations in national networks owned by major corporations (as in the United States, but also in Italy, India, Australia, and elsewhere) induced growing standardization of content under the semblance of differentiation (...). (p. 60)

Radio, the medium of mass communication most adaptable to individual schedules and audience locations during the twentieth century, followed a similar path of vertical integration. Technological change, under the conditions of ownership concentration, has led to a growing control of local content by centralized studios that serve the entire network. Digital recording and editing allow for the integration of local radio stations in corporate national networks. Most of the content of local news is, in fact, not local, and some “exclusive” investigative reporting is a generic program tailored to the context of each audience. Automated music broadcasting on the basis of pre-recorded catalogues brings radio stations closer to the iPod model of music on demand. (p. 61)

Thus, technologies of freedom and their potential for diversification do not necessarily lead to differentiation of programming and localization of content; rather, they allow for the falsification of identity in an effort to combine centralized control and decentralized delivery as an effective business strategy (Klinenberg, 2007: 27) (p. 61)

Tipos de redes: política, mídia, Internet.

Switch: comutar, alternar, modificar, ligar.
Computer networking, open source software (including Internet protocols), and the fast development of digital switching and transmission capacity in telecommunication networks led to the dramatic expansion of the Internet after its privatization in the 1990s. The Internet is, in fact, an old technology: it was first deployed in 1969. But it diffused on a large scale 20 later because of several factors: regulatory changes, greater bandwidth in telecommunications, the diffusion of personal computers, user-friendly software programs that made it easy to upload, access and communicate content (beginning with the World Wide Web server and browser in 1990), and the rapidly growing social demand for the networking of everything, arising both from the needs of the business world and from the public’s desire to build its own communication networks (Abbate, 1999; Castells, 2001; Benkler, 2006). (p. 61)

The Internet, the World Wide Web, and wireless communication are not media in the traditional sense. Rather, they are means of interactive communication. However, I argue, like most other analysts in this field, that the boundaries between mass media communication and all other forms of communication are blurring (Cardoso, 2006; Rice, 2008). (...) In fact, in the information economy, most of the time spent on the Internet is working time or studying time (Castells et al., 2007). We do not “watch” the Internet as we watch television. (...) Furthermore, the Internet is increasingly used to access the mass media (television, radio, newspapers), as well as any form of digitized cultural or informational product (films, music, magazines, books, journal articles, databases). (p. 64)

The web has already transformed television. (p. 64)

So, television continues to be a major mass medium, but its delivery and format are being transformed as its reception becomes individualized (...). (p. 64)

Thus, YouTube and other user-generated content web sites are means of mass communication. However, they are different from traditional mass media. Anyone can post a video on YouTube, with few restrictions. And the user selects the video the video she wants to watch and comment on from a huge list of possibilities. Pressures are, of course, exercised on free expression on YouTube, particularly legal threats for copyright infringements and government censorship of political content in situations of crisis. (p. 67)

Wikipedia = open-source encyclopedia (p. 67)

Free software program – Kazaa (p. 68)

The growing interest of corporate in Internet-based forms of communication recognizes the significance of the rise of a new form of societal communication, the one I have been referring to as mass self-communication. It is mass communication because it reaches a potentially global audience through p2p networks and Internet connection. It is multimodal, as the digitization of content and advanced social software, often based on open source programs that can be downloaded for free, allows the reformatting of almost any content in almost any form, increasingly distributed via wireless networks. It is also self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many who communicate with many. This is a new communication realm, and ultimately a new medium, whose backbone is made of computer networks, whose language is digital, and whose backbone is made of computer
networks, whose language is digital, and whose senders are globally distributed and globally interactive. True, the medium, even a medium as revolutionary as this one, does not determine the content and effect of its messages. But it has the potential to make possible unlimited diversity and autonomous production of the most of the communication flows that construct meaning in the public mind. Yet, the revolution in communication technology and the new cultures of autonomous communication are processed and shaped (although not determined) by organizations and institutions that are largely influenced by business strategies of profit-making and market expansion. (p. 70)

In the network society, the media operate mostly according to a business logic, regardless of their legal status. They depend on advertisers, corporate sponsors, and consumer fees to make a profit on behalf of their shareholders. Although there are some instances of relatively independent public service (for example, the BBC, Spanish TVE, Italian RAI, South African SABC, Canadian CBC, Australian ABC, and so on), these broadcasters face increasing pressure to commercialize their programming in order to maintain their audience share in the face of competition from the private sector (EUMap, 2005, 2008). Indeed, many public broadcasters, such as the BBC and South Africa’s SABC, have launched corporate for-profit arms in order to fund their public initiatives. Meanwhile, in countries such as China, state-controlled media operations are moving from a propaganda-oriented model to an audience-centered corporate model (Huang, 2007). Furthermore, while the Internet is an autonomous network of local/global communication, private and public corporation also own its infrastructure, and its most popular social spaces and web sites are fast becoming a segment of multimedia business. (Artz, 2007; Chester, 2007). (p. 71)

Because the media are predominantly a business, the same major trends that have transformed the business world – globalization, digitization, networking, and deregulation – have radically altered media operations (Schiller, 1999, 2007). These trends have removed most of the limits to corporate media expansion, allowing for the consolidation of oligopolistic control by a few companies over much of the core of the global network of media. However, the largest media conglomerates are rooted in the West, but most media businesses around the world remain nationally and/or locally focused. Almost no media organizations are truly global and a decreasing number of media outlets are singularly local. What are global are the networks that connect media financing, production, and distribution within countries and between countries. The major organizational transformation of media that we observe is the formation of global networks of interlocked multimedia businesses organized around strategic partnerships. (p. 71)

Yet, these networks are organized around dominant nodes. A small number of mega-corporations form the backbone of the global network of media networks. Their dominance is predicated on their ability to leverage and connect to locally and nationally focused media organizations everywhere. Conversely, nationally and regionally focused media organizations increasingly rely on partnerships with these mega-corporations to facilitate their own corporate expansion. Although capital and production are globalized, the content of media is customized to local cultures and to the diversity of segmented audiences. So, in ways that are typical of other industries, globalization and diversification hand in hand. In fact, the two processes are intertwined: only global networks can master the resources of global media
production, but their ability to conquer market shares depends on the adaptation of their content to the taste of local audiences. Capital is global; identities are local or national. (p. 72)

The digitization of communication has prompted the diffusion of a technologically integrated system in which products and processes are developed on diverse platforms that support a variety of content and media expressions within the same global/local communication network. The share digital language allows economies of scale and, even more important, economies of synergy between these various platforms and products. By economies of synergy, I mean that the integration of platforms and products may yield a return greater than the sum of the parts invested in the merger or networking of these platforms and products. Synergy takes place as a result of processes of creativity and innovation facilitated by the integration. (p. 72)

Digitization of communication? Or digitization of information?

The diffusion of the Internet and of wireless communication has decentralized the communication network, providing the opportunity for multiple entry point into the network of networks. While the rise of this form of mass self-communication increases the autonomy and freedom of communicating actors, this cultural and technological autonomy does not necessarily lead to autonomy from media business. Indeed, it creates new markets and new business opportunities. Media groups have become integrated in global media networks, one of whose aims is the privatization and commercialization of the Internet to expand and exploit these new markets. (p. 73)

The result of these variegated trends and their interaction is the formation of a new global multimedia system. To understand communication in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to identify the structure and dynamics of this multimedia system. (p. 73)

The core of global media networks is formed by multimedia corporations whose main source of revenue and diversified holdings originate from multiple regions and countries around the world. As stated above, “global media” organizations are not truly global; their networks are. (p. 73)

Largest globalized media corporations: Time Warner, Disney, News Corporation, Bertelsmann, NBC Universal, Viacom, and CBS. (p. 73)

I will then include in this analysis the interaction of these “Magnificent Seven” with the largest diversified Internet/computer companies: Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Apple. (p. 73)

Looking at the configuration of this global media core, we can observe four inter-related trends:

1. Media ownership is increasingly concentrated.
2. At the same time, media conglomerates are now able to deliver a diversity of products over one platform as well as one product over a diversity of platforms. They also form new products by the combination of digital portions of different products.
3. The customization and segmentation of audiences in order to maximize advertising revenues is encouraged by the fluid movement of communication products across platforms.

4. Finally, the extent to which these strategies are successful is determined by the ability of internal media networks to find optimal economics of synergy that take the advantage of the changing communications environment.

Control over the space of communication has thus always ebbed and flowed as a result of complementary and contradictory changes in regulation, markets, the political environment, and technological innovations. However, the digitization of information and the rise of satellite, wireless, and Internet communication platforms mean that traditional firewalls to ownership expansion are diminished. (p. 74)

Exemplo de parceria entre empresas multinacionais de mídia com empresas de Internet:

Google provides advertising delivery for News Corporation’s MySpace social-networking site. (p. 77)

Viacom provides MTV shows to MSN streaming video (parceria Viacom x Microsoft) (p. 76)

Telecomunicação, é uma forma de estender o alcance normal da comunicação (tele em grego significa “distância”) e a palavra comunicação deriva do latim communicare, que significa “tornar comum”, ”partilhar”, ”conferenciar”.. Quando o destino da informação está próximo da fonte, a transmissão é direta e imediata, tal como se processa a conversação entre duas pessoas num mesmo ambiente. Quando a distância entre elas aumenta, no entanto, o processo de comunicação direta se torna mais difícil. Há então a necessidade de um sistema de telecomunicação - um conjunto de meios e dispositivos que permita a fonte e destino se comunicarem a distância.

Seria a Comunicação Digital também uma forma de telecomunicação ou ao falarmos de TELEcomunicação o que nos vem a cabeça são as telefonias, sejam elas fixas ou móveis? A comunicação digital apesar de ser um termo completamente novo da sociedade em que vivemos, parece ser bem comum aos nossos ouvidos. Já nos acostumamos a ouvir falar sobre ela com tanta frequência que passamos a achar que realmente sabemos o que ela significa e em que ela nos atinge. Ela é a forma comunicativa dessa sociedade. É a forma de comunicação mais poderosa que já foi inventada pelo homem e o mais incrível é que ela ainda esta sendo moldada, o que significa que nós ainda temos tempo de fazer parte dela e de moldá-la a nossos padrões, antes que os moldados sejamos nós mesmos. Ela integra o conjunto dos seres humanos, é a "aldeia global" realizada e integrada à velocidade da luz por vias de comunicação digital. Não há hoje uma única força protodutiva que não esteja direta ou indiretamente, engajada e interligada em algum tipo de comunicação digital. Nos resta saber até onde ela é interessante e até onde ela esta nos ajudando.

The largest media organizations now own more properties than ever, and also own more proprietary content that is delivered via different platforms. (p. 77)

In recent years, the blurring of boundaries between Internet, media, and telecommunications companies has only accelerated. (p. 79)
Conversely, Internet companies moved to penetrate the offline media market. (...) And in 2007, Google initiated a partnership with Panasonic to launch a high definition television set that would broadcast traditional television programming as well as Internet content (Hayashi, 2008). (p. 79)

Ver página 78, fig. 2.2 que explica a integração vertical das maiores companhias de mídia, que incluem cada vez mais a Internet, enquanto companhias de Internet estão cada vez mais criando parcerias com organizações de mídia.

Content supported by embedded advertising is supplanting paid-content models (i.e., traditional 30-seconds commercials). (p. 80)

The ability to replicate content and consequently advertising across platforms generates economies of synergy, a fundamental component of the business strategy of corporate news. (p. 82)

The key is synergy. Synergy is based on the compatibility of the merging (fusão) networks. Production merges, not property. Networked organizations appear to more successful business models in contemporary multimedia conglomerates than horizontal property integrations. (p. 83)

New’s Corporation’s growing competitive advantage in the global market depends less on its size than on its organizational networking strategy, which supports economies of synergy. (p. 83)

In sum, the companies that form the core of global media networks are pursuing policies of ownership concentration, inter-company partnerships, platform diversification, audience customization, and economies of synergy with varying degrees of success. In turn, the internal configuration of these media businesses is heavily dependent on the ability to leverage and connect to the broader network of media businesses. Moreover, the fate of second-tier national media industries is largely of their ability to connect to these global media networks. (p. 84)

Regional players are actively importing global content and localizing it, and global media organizations are pursuing local partners to deliver customized content to audiences. Processes of localization and globalization work together to expand a global network. (p. 84)

Multinational media, in the form of news agencies like Reuters (established in 1851), have existed since the mid-nineteenth century, but policies of deregulation accelerated in the mid-1990s, paving the way for greater imbrication between multinational and local media organizations. (p. 86)

First, an obvious example of global influence on local media markets is the direct import of programming and channels such as CNN, Fox, ESPN, HBO, and other transnational media channels. (p. 87)

Several scholars have written about the diffusion of corporate and cultural formats from the global to the local sphere. Thussu (1998) describes the “Murdochisation of the media” in India
as “the process which involves the shift of media power from the public to privately owned, transnational, multimedia corporations controlling both delivery systems and the content of global information networks” (1998: 7). This “Murdochisation” is characterized by “a tendency toward market-driven journalism thriving on circulation and ratings wars; transnational influence of US-inspired media formats, products, and discourse; and lastly, an emphasis on infotainment, undermining the role of the media for public infotainment”. Lee Artz (2007) has analyzed the rise of “transnational media projects” or “enterprises that produce within one nation but are jointly owned by multiple corporations from multiple nations... [and] have no national allegiance and bring together capitalist classes from two or more nations for the purpose of producing and profiting from media commodities” (2007: 148). For example, Germany’s Vox television channel is owned by the Australian/American News Corporation (49.5%), France’s Canal Plus (24.9%), and Germany’s Bertelsmann (24.9%). (p. 89)

Thirdly, global media players export programs and content which are produced for local formats, but typically are based around standards formats popularized in the West. Iwabuchi (2008: 148) refers to this process as “local camouflaging”. Shows such as Pop Idol, Survivor, and Who Wants to Be a Millionaire have been franchised to many countries. Viacom has been at the forefront of this process of localizing content. Its motto is “think globally, act locally”. Its MTV (Music Television) property is perhaps the most customized media platform in the world with service in 140 countries and customized Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, African, and European channels featuring local talent and presenters. MTV also engages in partnerships with local outlets. For example, in China, MTV sponsors major award shows in cooperation with CCTV and the Shanghai Media Group (Murdock, 2006). (p. 89)

The most obvious example of local/national influence over global media networks is through regulation and deregulation. The opening of China’s and India’s media markets spurred a wave of attempts by global multinationals to conquer these markets. Still, these states maintain a great deal of control over the structure and content of their entry. For example, when Microsoft and Yahoo! launched in China, they had to install software that automatically filters controversial words such as Tibet, Falun Gong, freedom, and democracy. Earlier, Murdoch’s Star TV agreed to remove BBC World from its service in order to be allowed to launch in China. As Murdock (2006) points out, the localizing strategies of global media organizations must take into account the simultaneous rise of the globalized strategies of regional media platforms. He cites India as the archetype of this process, where globalization is less an influx of Western culture into India than the outflow of Indian cultural products into the global sphere (2006: 25). (p. 90)

Thus, just as global media companies are trying to insert their content into local markets, other media organizations are pursuing strategies to find ways to circulate their content globally, often via the core global media corporations. For instance, the story and characters of Disney’s Lion King originated in Japanese Manga comics. (p. 91)

Global influences the local AND Local influences the Global

Switching networks:
Media networks do not exist in a vacuum. Their success is dependent on their ability to successfully leverage connections to other critical networks in finance, technology, cultural industries, advertising industries, suppliers of content, regulatory agencies, and political circles at large. (p. 93)

The solidification and expansion of the global business media network is also dependent on numerous other connections to non-media networks, which in turn also leverage their connections with media organizations. Thus, the connection to financial networks is an essential component of media business networks. (p. 93)

Media business are particularly attractive to private investors because the typically require little capital investments and generate large revenues. These investor typically seek maximum return on their investments, but play no role in the day-to-day operations of their media investments. (p. 94)

The advertising industry is another decisive network that connects with media business networks. (...) The advertising industry includes agencies as well as graphic design services, display advertisements, and media representatives (IBIS, 2008). (p. 95)

Strategic partnerships between media properties and Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, and many regionally popular search engines are an attempt to harness end-user behavior to maximize advertising revenues. In 2007, News Corporation, for example, signed a $900 million deal with Google to provide targeted search advertising for its Internet properties. (p. 97)

Supplier networks are fundamental to the operation of multimedia networks. These include, but are not limited to, news agencies, talent agencies, and labor networks. Media corporatization has encouraged cost-cutting measures that include the closing of regional and international news bureaus and the streamlining of journalistic practices. News agencies such as Reuters, Bloomberg, the Associated Press, and World Television News are thus critical suppliers for news content for many media properties around the world (Klinenberg, 2005). Wu (2007), for example, found that the news agencies were a critical determinant of the international news coverage of CNN and The New York Times. (p. 98)

THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY POLICIES (p. 99)

While the revolution in information and communication technologies is a fundamental component of the ongoing transformation, its actual consequences in the communication realm depend on policy decisions that result from the debates and conflicts conducted by business, social, and political interest groups seeking to establish the regulatory regime within which corporations and individuals operate. (p. 99)

There has been a tectonic shift in the regulation of communication in all countries from the mid-1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, albeit with different orientations and emphases depending on the culture and politics of each country. Yet, overall, there has been a dominant trend toward the liberalization, privatization, and regulated deregulation of both broadcast and telecommunication industries. (p. 100)
It helps to differentiate between four domains of regulation of communication: broadcasting, the print press, the Internet, and telecommunication networks. There is reciprocity among the four and they have converged to form a digital communication system. However, because regulatory institutions have a history, policies have developed differently in each one of these four domains. Furthermore, there are at least three different areas of regulation that are transversal to the four domains mentioned above: namely, regulation of content, including the enforcement of intellectual property rights; regulation of ownership; and regulation of service imposed on operators and broadcasters (for example, universal service of telephony, non-discriminatory access to the common carrier networks, and so on). (p. 100)

The matter is further complicated if we adopt a global perspective because the regulator is a plural actor, as different institutions assume specific responsibilities in each one of these four domains and three areas. Even in the United States, where the supposedly independent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has responsibility for both broadcasting and telecommunications (in contrast, for instance, with most European countries), the governance of the Internet was originally under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department, and is now the responsibility of the Commerce Department; the regulation of media and Internet company ownership comes partly under the anti-trust legislation enforced by the Justice Department; and surveillance of activity is conducted the Homeland Security Agency, while Congress tries to legislate on a variety of issues (such as the failed attempt to impose censorship on the Internet in the 1996 Communications Decency Act) and courts intervene decisively to resolve the growing number of conflicts derived from the implementation of communication policies. (p. 100)

An analysis of this complex set of regulatory institutions, policies, and practices is beyond the scope of this book, and, in fact, is not need because there are number of excellent studies on the subject (Price, 2002; Wilson, 2004; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006; International Journal of Communication, 2007. Klinenberg, 2007; Rice, 2008; Terzis, 2008; Cowhey and Aronson, 2009). (p. 101)

In the United States, there were three pivotal moments of evolution in the regulated deregulation of communication in the digital age. The first came in 1984, with the divestiture of the monopoly of ATT in telecommunications, ushering in managed competition in the communication industries, while preserving local monopolies for cable operators. (p. 101)

The second key legislative measure was the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which substantially lifted the restrictions on concentration of ownership in the media industries. As a direct consequence of this Act, there was a swift movement toward corporate consolidation, leading to the formation of multimedia oligopolies, particularly in the major metropolitan areas, as documented in the preceding sector of this chapter. This concentrations of ownership affected television, radio, and the print press, although, in the case of print press the process of concentration predates the 1996 Act. For instance, in 1945, 80 percent of American newspapers were privately owned, often by families. In 2007, more than 80 percent of American newspapers were owned by corporations, most of which were subsidiaries of major multimedia groups (Klinenberg, 2007: 31). Furthermore, the 1996 Act authorized mergers and alliances between companies of different segments of the industry (for instance, between
telecommunication operators and media companies, including Internet companies), thus opening the way for the interlocked business communication system that emerges in the early twenty-first century. The 1996 Act was also important because it reiterated the operators’ obligation to allow sharing of the networks under similar conditions for all users (the so-called unbundling policy). This limited the capacity of the new mega-corporations resulting from permitted mergers to appropriate the technological revolution for their benefit. (p. 101)

In terms of media content, the FCC has traditionally kept a low profile to avoid interfering with the principle of free speech set by the First Amendment, though it encouraged discretion to protect children from harmful programming and to limit pornographic broadcasting. Yet, Congress and the government became much more belligerent toward the control of content on the Internet. The key rationale for the Communications Decency Act of 1996 was the prevention of child pornography online. But after the courts overturned the provisions of the Act related to the control of free communication on the Internet, censorship attempts receded until 2001, when the terrorist threat facilitated the passing of new legislation authorizing government surveillance of the Internet and control of the diffusion of certain types of information. The proposition was almost impossible to execute, as proven by the proliferation of Bin Laden’s proclamations and the material of other terrorist groups over the Internet. (p. 102)

What became the most important issue in terms of content control on the Internet was the enforcement of technologically outdated copyright laws over digitized material circulating on the Internet, particularly via p2p networks. Under relentless pressure from the media and cultural industries, Congress enacted legislation extending and expanding copyright protection, and the courts were used as firewalls against the culture of sharing and remixing that had blossomed on the Internet. Indeed, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 represented a serious threat to the remix culture that is at the heart of creativity in the digital age. Although this legislative arsenal had an intimidation effect on Internet users, it was not capable of preventing the mass insurrection (by the tens of millions) of users/producers of content against the media oligopolies’ perceived capture of free digital culture (Lessig, 2004; Benkler, 2006; Gillespie, 2007). (p. 102)

The impromptu evolution of Internet regulation and management parallels the serendipitous maturation of the Internet as the communication commons of the network society (Abbate, 1999; Castells, 2001; Movius, forthcoming). (p. 103)

The third major step toward the creation of a new regulatory environment for digital communication in the United States took place in the 2000s: a series of bills approved in Congress and decisions adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that rewrote the provisions of the 1996 Act, thus enabling companies to invest in different industries and to proceed with vertical integration between carriers, manufacturers, and providers of content, while curtailing public scrutiny over business practices (Benkler, 2006; Klinenberg, 2007; McCesney, 2007; Schiller, 2007). (p. 105)

Thus, while the attention of the world was focused on freedom of expression on the Internet, the transformation of the communication infrastructure into a series of “walled gardens” managed by network operators, with respect to their specific business interests, imposed
fundamental constraints upon the expansion of the new digital culture. The pipes of the Internet Galaxy are being privatized and left to their own fragmented management. While we are concerned about protecting the free electronic frontier against the intrusion of Big Brother (the government), the Big Sisters (major networks operators), who appropriate and manage the broadband traffic circulating through the Information Superhighways, have become the ones responsible for restricting free virtual space. (p. 107)

The evolution of regulatory policies was the result of power-making strategies through the articulation of business and political interests, dressed up in discourses about technological wonders and consumer choice and supported by economic models worshipping the higher authority of the Invisible Hand. While there were intra-business conflicts in the 1990s between the supporters of the “Baby Bells” (long-distance carriers) and cable operators, when it came to the main decision of letting the market (i.e., big business) decide the shape of communication revolution, most of the political class espoused the strategy. The 1996 Act, under Clinton, received the support of the Republican Congress, and many of the measures allowing vertical integration and cross-industry investment recruited supporters from both parties. This is because the telecommunications industry plays a major role in financing political campaigns, while the broadcasting industry is essential in facilitating media coverage of political candidates. The nascent Internet companies took some time to develop political clout and they were too self-satisfied with the mantra of their innate superiority as technological innovators to worry about the future. Furthermore, the public was largely unaware of the importance of the issues that were being decided without consultation or debate. Communication regulation was an obscure field reserved to lawyers, economists, and engineers which did not seem to be related to the concerns of the commons, except in pricing and service abuse claims against monopoly cable operators, matters that were more often than not blamed on the licenses issued by local governments with little information about what they were doing. (p. 107)

Deregulating the World (but not the American Way)

Throughout the world, there has also been a widespread trend toward liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of broadcasting and telecommunications since the 1980s, but at a slower pace than in the United States. However, the regulatory regime was, and still is, to a large extent, different from the United States. In fact, the United States represents the exception in the history of communication regulation from a global perspective. This is because, in the world at large, communication has always been considered too important to be left to private business. Throughout history, communication was seen as a critical domain in which to assert government control, sometimes on behalf of the public interest, and sometimes as a naked expression of state power, with business interests coming in second. Furthermore, there has been a distinctive separation between regulation of the media and regulation of telecommunications throughout the world. The latter was seen as a public-service infrastructure, while the former was considered a key instrument of political and cultural control. Thus, generally speaking, the media were regulated by the political and ideological institutions of the state. Television and radio were usually government owned and government operated, although some room was left to for private ownership, though this was always kept under the close eye of the would-be censors. By contrast, newspapers
and the print press were usually trusted to the various elites so that they could have their own voice in the public sphere, with the exception of countries under rightwing or leftwing dictatorships, in which all the media were kept under control of the party of the dictator. But even in democratic countries, the print press was subject to political inclinations so that the idyllic notion of an independent professional press was usually belied by the political and ideological alignment of most media, often the expression of religious affiliations, ideological preferences, business interests, and political parties. Overall, the state and ideological apparatuses were the matrix of the media more than the market. Of course, business was present in the media, but commercial strategies had to operate under the umbrella of the holders of political-ideological power. (p. 109)

This state of affairs changed in most parts of the world from the 1980s onward. At the source of the change was the wave of liberalization policies linked to new economic strategies in the context of globalization, the rapid technological change that opened up a new universe of communicative capabilities, and the cultural change toward individualism and freedom of choice that weakened the foundations of ideological conservatism, particularly in developed countries. How this transformed into new forms of regulation varied between countries. In some of the most important countries in the world (China, Russia, India), in spite of a growing business presence in the media, there is still, in the twenty-first century, tight direct (China, Russia) or indirect (India) government control over the media. But in most countries, regulatory regime is exercised by a combination of government ownership and government licenses to business groups that must follow rules that limit their power as fully independent media groups. The usual method of submitting business to political will in the media industry is to distribute spectrum licenses between different business partnerships related to a plurality of political orientations. Thus, whoever is in power always has some access to some media group. The vertical integration of television, radio, and the print press facilitates this division of labor in the media under the control of the political system at large. In addition, in all countries there are still some networks that are owned by the government and in which the independence of the media is limited. (p. 110)

There are exceptions to this general pattern, on both sides. For instance, in the UK, the BBC has been hailed around the world as a model of a public corporation asserting its independence from direct government interference, although some acts by the Blair government tarnished this image without destroying the reputation of the BBC as a reference for independent public media around the world. However, the BBC had to compete with private television networks and the satellite and cable companies that won a substantial market share of the audience, so that it lost its dominant position. On the other extreme of the liberalized media world, Italy, under the government of Berlusconi, produced a most original model of public-private partnership. The Italian government owned the three RAI networks, historically known for their professionalism, that were subjected to heavy political pressures in spite of determined resistance by journalists and producers. On the other hand, Berlusconi, a real-estate businessman, with the support of the Socialist prime minister Bettino Craxi, used a loophole in the Italian Constitution to build three private national television networks on the basis of the local stations that he owned. Berlusconi leverage his media power from these networks to be elected prime minister in 1994, and then re-elected. So, in the 1990s and 2000s, all national television networks, public or
private, were under his control, with obvious consequences for the impoverishment of cultural and political diversity of Italy (Bosetti, 2007). France privatized most public television (TFI was sold to a construction company), while reserving control over some channels, such as TV7, and partly dedicating one public network (Antenne 2) to cultural programming for the solace of French intellectuals. (p. 111)

In short, the most important regulatory policy in Europe and in no most of the world has been the gradual, yet limited, released of the national government’s control over radio and television, and indirectly over the print press, in favor of a diversity of private business groups and regional governments. Media businesses often used this relative autonomy to link up with global business networks, thereby increasing their independence vis-à-vis the government. (p. 111)

The commercialization of the media around the world has received widespread support from public opinion because they have largely escaped (and are still in the process of doing so, in many countries) the iron cage of political bureaucracies. Up-to-date entertainment is a winner over propaganda supplemented with old films and national folklore. This feeling of relative liberation from the political grip in the past two decades may explain the quasi-absence of social protests against media policy in most countries, save for the self-interested claims of business groups losing out in the licensing process. Indeed, when and where media-oriented social movements have taken place, they are not directed toward media business but toward the state to fight its censorship. This is particularly the case in Russia under Putin, where journalists and citizens are fighting an authoritarian media regime guided by political motivation from the highest levels of the state (see Chapter 4). (p. 111)

In most of the world, telecommunication regulation has changed dramatically from a monopoly regime (legally or de facto) to a policy of re-regulation and competition that started to take hold in Europe in 1998 and in Japan in 2000 (Rutherford, 2004; OECD, 2007; Cowhey and Aronson, 2009). Supposedly independent telecommunication regulators were established in most countries, and in the European Union, the European Commission assumed oversight of the national regulators. Regulatory authorities prevent monopolistic practices and abusive pricing, submitting companies to fines and mandatory directives. Yet, the original monopolies, even after their privatization, have leveraged their resources and political connections to retain a dominant position in their national territories while embarking on ambitious policies of global expansion and strategic partnerships. (p. 112)

Wireless communication is a more competitive field because it is a newer industry, and in some countries, like China, private wireless operators are used by the government to put pressure on the old wireline operators (Qiu, 2007). However, this policy of managed competition in Europe, Japan, and South Korea seems to have won the upper hand over the disorganized competition induced in the US by the FCC with its free-for-all policies. Broadband penetration is higher in Northern Europe, Japan, and South Korea than in the United States, and its cost per bit is lower. The unbundling rule is still in effect in Europe, thus keeping, for the time being, the principle of network neutrality. Furthermore, the agreement on standards and pricing schemes imposed by the European Commission to wireless communication operators in Europe has led to a higher penetration of wireless
communication, higher usage, and higher quality service in Europe than in the United States. The competitive edge of Europe and Asia in this area was also helped by the quality of wireless communication technology and manufacturing design in Europe (particularly in Nordic countries) and East Asia. In short, regulation in telecommunication networks in the world at large has kept a greater degree of government control over the operators than in the United States, while unleashing managed competition. The net result has been an expansion of broadband and wireless communication, laying the groundwork for a global diffusion of the infrastructure of the digital communication age, and particularly of the Internet in its new Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 incarnations. (p. 112)

Regulating freedom: when the red hood Internet meets the big bad corporate wolves (p. 113)

The Internet is a global network, so its regulation could not be left to the US Department of Commerce, even in the form of an ICANN board elected by Internet users. But since there is no global government, the Internet diffused globally, restrained only by limits that each national government could impose within its territorial jurisdiction. Yet, short of unplugging the Internet, it is difficult to control its networking capabilities because they can always be redirected to a backbone somewhere else on the planet. True, it is possible to block access to some designated sites, but not the trillions of e-mail messages and the millions of web sites in constant processes of renewal. Yes, the Internet can be supervised and is, in fact, being actively supervised by all governments in the world (Deibert et al., 2008). But the best governments can do to enforce their legislation is to prosecute a few unfortunate culprits who are caught in the act, while millions of others enjoy their merry ride over the web. Hundreds of Internet freedom fighters (plus a few crooks and child pornographers) end up in real jails to pay for their virtual vagaries. Yet, while a few of the messengers are punished, the messages go on, most of them surfing the ocean of global, seamless communication (see Chapter 4). (p. 113)

This is why the only legitimate body with responsibility for global governance, the United Nations, took up the issue of the Internet in two consecutive World Information Summits, one in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2003 and in 2005 in Tunis, Tunisia (a country known for its Internet censorship and where journalists covering the meeting were arrested). In December 2003, a number of goals were discussed in Geneva, focusing on information and communication technologies for the benefit of the world’s population. Naturally, the Internet became a focal point in many of these discussions. The Geneva Declaration of Principles and Geneva Plan of Action were adopted on December 12, 2003, but participants were unable to agree on a definition of Internet governance. Debates centered on the distinction between a “narrow” definition that encompassed only ICANN-related functions (Internet resources allocation and assignment) and a “broad” definition that would include, ultimately, control over the content circulated through the Internet. As is usually the case in United Nations’ meetings, when faced with disagreement over the very concept of “Internet governance”, the UN established a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) whose objective was to define the term and provide input to the second phase of the World
Summit in Tunis in November 2005. After two years of hard labor by the 40 members of the group, who represented stakeholders from governments, the private sector, and civil society, the August 2005 WGIG Report gave birth to the following working definition: “Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” (p. 114)

Enlightened by this path-breaking definition, the 2005 UN World Summit on the Information Society (Second Phase) in Tunis, after a debate on policy principles, confirmed the role of ICANN and the overseeing capacity of the US Commerce Department, defined an agenda for the global information society, and established the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). IGF is an international organization whose purpose is to “support the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) with regard to convening a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue.” The UN Secretary-General established an Advisory Group and a Secretariat as institutional bodies of the IGF. Subsequently, the IGF held several meetings in Greece in 2006, in Rio de Janeiro in 2007, in Hyderabad in November 2008, and, at the time of writing, a meeting is planned for Cairo in October 2009. There has been an identification of the key policy areas under discussion. These are:

1. Internet infrastructure and resource management (physical infrastructure, VoIP; spectrum policy; technical standards; resource management; administration of Internet names and addresses; administration of root-server system and root-zone files).
2. Issues relating to the use of the Internet (security of network and information systems; spam; national policies and regulations; critical infrastructure protection).
3. Issues with wider impact than the Internet (electronic authentication; competition policy; liberalization, privatization, regulations; access protection, consumer/user protection, privacy; unlawful content and practices; dispute resolution; intellectual property rights; e-commerce and taxation of e-commerce; e-government and privacy; freedom of information and media).
4. Issues with developmental impact (internet-leased line costs; affordable and universal access; education, human-capacity building; national infrastructure development; social dimensions and inclusion; content accessibility; open source and free software; cultural and linguistic diversity). (p. 115)

According to reliable sources, the policy debate is proceeding at the usual pace for this kind of institutional setting, although there is no conclusion yet to report at the same time of writing. I hope to be able to analyze the structure and policy of global Internet governance emerging from this debate in the second, or perhaps tenth, edition of this book. (p. 115)

My skepticism (ceticismo) about the results of these debates stems from (origina-se de) my own experience on a number of national and international advisory boards on Internet policy. I came to the conviction (leading, of course, to my withdrawal from all these bodies, including those related to the United Nations) that the fundamental concern of most
governments is to establish regulations to control the Internet and find mechanisms to enforce this control in the traditional terms of law and order. Regardless of my personal feelings about such a policy (I am against it), there are serious reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the proposed controls when they are not directed toward specific corporations or organizations but at the user community at large (unless there is a generalized attack on Internet service providers that would cripple the entire Internet communication system – never say never). Yet this is an unlikely hypothesis given the extent of business interests already invested in the Internet and the widespread support that the Internet enjoys among most of the 1.4 billion users for whom it has become the communication fabric of their lives. Therefore, the regulation of the Internet has shifted its focus from the Internet itself to specific instances of censorship and repression by government bureaucracies, and to the privatization of the global communication infrastructure that supports Internet traffic. So, in spite of regulation, the Internet thrives as the local/global, multimodal communication medium of our age. But it submits, as everything else in our world, to relentless pressure from two essential sources of domination that still loom over our existence: capital and state. (p. 116)

The relationship between capital and the state is indeed the source of the policies of liberalization and deregulation that induced the rise of global capitalism and the formation of global multimedia business networks at the heart of the new digital communication system. But because business interests seem to prevail in their interaction with state, and because business sees a major new field of investment in the expansion of digital communication, regulatory policies have been conducive to the global diffusion of new forms of communication, including mass self-communication. Under such conditions, the media audience is transformed into a communicative subject increasingly able to redefine the processes by which societal communication frames the culture of society. Paradoxically, the yielding (submissão) of the state to the interest of capital leads to the rise of a new form of communication that may increase the power of citizens over both capital and the state. (p. 116)

For communication to happen, senders and receivers need to share codes. In the media business, there has been a strategic shift from broadcasting to a generic audience (assuming its ability to identify with a homogeneous message) to targeting specific audiences, thus adapting the message to the intended receiver. (p. 116)

Culture has taken on another, different logic with the transition from the culture industry to global culture industry; globalization has given culture industry a fundamentally different mode of operation. Our point is that in 1945 and in 1975 culture was still fundamentally the superstructure... Cultural entities were still exceptional... But in 2005 cultural objects are everywhere: as information, as communication, as branded products, as financial services, as media products, as transport and leisure services, cultural entities are no longer the exception: they are the rule. Culture is so ubiquitous that it, as it were, seeps out of the superstructure and comes to infiltrate, and then take over the infrastructure itself. It comes to dominate both the economy and experience in everyday life... In global culture industry, production and consumption are processes of the construction of difference (Lash and Lury, 2007: 3-5; emphasis added). (p. 116)
If we combine the two bipolar axes of cultural identification, we can detect four significant combinations that are expressed in definite forms of cultural patterns, as shown in Figure 2.6. I shall elaborate on the content of the typology presented here. The articulation between globalization and individualism leads to the diffusion of consumerism as the individual form of relationship to a process of globalization dominated by expansion of capital (Barber, 2007). A particularly important expression of this individual relationship to a global capitalist culture, as proposed by Scott Lash and Celia Lury (2007), is branding. Branding is the cultural dimension of the global market, and the process by which individuals assign meaning to their consumerism (Banet-Weiser, 2007). (p. 119)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GLOBALIZATION</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALISM</td>
<td>Branded consumerism</td>
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<td>Networked individualism</td>
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<td>COMMUNALISM</td>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
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<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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Fig. 2.6 Typology of cultural patterns (p. 120)

In sum: the global entertainment industry, which supports and is supported by advertising, is the main channel for the construction of consumerist, branded culture. The United States industry, as exemplified by the Hollywood industrial complex, is a major player in this industry, not the only one by any means. Besides, the global entertainment industry does not diffuse just American culture, but any cultural product that sells both at the global level and in its customized, culturally specific form. Ex: the ugly betty (p. 123)

Protocols of communication, in this context, refers to practices and their supporting organizational platforms that make the sharing of meaning possible between the cultural fields of the global network society (consumerism, networked individualism, cosmopolitanism, and multiculturalism). Protocols of communication are transversal practices that are intertwined with the practices embodied in each one of the four cultural patterns that I have identified. The mains protocols of communication are the following: (p. 126)

Advertising is the backbone of global and local media business networks (Gluck and Roca-Sales, 2008). Thus, it is present everywhere, in all cultural patterns, and uses all platforms, from television and radio to the Internet and mobile phones. It is through advertising that the culture of commodification, at the heart of global capitalism, influences all cultural expressions and their media support.

The construction of a common media language, by means of reformatting a shared formula of storytelling and the integration of genres (e.g., infotainment), is made possible by the versatility of digitization (McClean, 2007).

Branding (whether commercial or otherwise) structures the relationship between individuals and collectives vis-à-vis diverse cultural patterns. Branding becomes most effective under the
condition of vertical integration of media products, facilitated by the globalization and networking of cultural industries (Lash and Lury, 2007).

The constitutions of a networked digital hypertext made of multidirectional feeds of everything and based on interactive connecting patterns from everyone to everyone induces a common culture: the culture of co-production of content that is consumed, regardless of the specific content. (p. 126)

In our society, the protocols of communication are not based on the sharing of culture but on the culture of sharing. This is why, ultimately, the protocols of communication are not external to the process of communicative action. They are built in people’s minds through the interaction between the multiple connecting points in the communication system and people’s own mental constructions in their communicative multitasking. It follows that the so-called audience is at the origin of the process of cultural change, reversing its historical dependence on the media during the mass communication era. (p. 126)

The results of Catalan study can be extrapolated in their analytical meaning. The grand convergence in communication, as Jenkins (2006) has proposed, is not just technological and organizational, although these are key dimensions that create the material basis for the broader process of convergence. Convergence is fundamentally cultural and takes place, primarily, in the minds of the communicative subjects who integrate various modes and channels of communication in their practice and in their interaction with each other. (p. 135)

**Conclusion of communication in the global digital age:**

The interactive capacity of the new communication system ushers in a new form of communication, mass self-communication, which multiplies and diversifies the entry points in the communication process. This gives rise to unprecedented autonomy for communicative subjects to communicate at large. Yet, this potential for autonomy is shaped, controlled, and curtailed by the growing concentration and interlocking of corporate media and network operators around the world. Global multimedia business networks (including government-owned media) have taken advantage of the tidal wave of deregulation and liberalization to integrate the networks of communication, the platforms of communication, and the channels of communication in their multilayered organizations, while setting up switches of connection to the networks of capital, political, and cultural production. (p. 135)

However, this is not tantamount to one-sided, vertical control of communicative practices for four reasons: (1) corporate communication is diverse and, to some extent, competitive, leaving room for some choice as a marketing strategy; (2) autonomous communication networks need a certain breathing space to be attractive to the citizens/consumers, thus expanding new communication markets; (3) regulatory policies are in the hands of institutions that, in principle, are supposed to defend the public interest, but they often betray this principle, as in the past two decades in the United States; (4) the new technologies of freedom increase people’s ability to appropriate the new forms of communication in ways that relentlessly try, not always with success, to run ahead of commodification and control. (p. 135)
Furthermore, the organizations of communication operate within the diverse cultural patterns of our world. These patterns are characterized by the opposition between globalization and identification, and by the tension between individualism and communalism. As a result, the global culture of universal commodification is culturally diversified and ultimately contested by other cultural expressions. Media organizations use new technologies and new forms of management, based on networking, to customize their messages to specific audiences, while providing a channel for the global exchange of local cultural manifestations. Therefore, the global digital communication system, while reflecting power relationships, is not based on the top-down diffusion of one dominant culture. It is diverse and flexible, open-ended in the content of its messages, depending on specific configurations of business, power, and culture. (p. 136)

Because people are recognized for their diversity (as long as they remain consumers) and because technologies of mass self-communication allow greater initiative to the communicative subjects (as long as they assert themselves as citizens), a creative audience emerges, remixing the multiplicity of messages and codes it receives with its own codes and communication projects. Thus, in spite of the growing concentration of power, capital, and production in the global communication system, the actual content and format of communication practices are increasingly diversified. (p. 136)

Yet, precisely because the process is so diverse, and because the technologies of communication are so versatile, the new global digital communication system becomes more inclusive and comprehensive of every form and content of societal communication. Everybody and everything finds a way of existence in this intertwined, multimodal, interactive communication text, so that any message external to this text remains an individual experience without much change of being socially communicated. Because our brains’ neural networks are activated through networked interaction with their environment, including their social environment, this new communication realm, in its variegated forms, becomes the main source of signal leading to the construction of meaning in people’s minds. Since meaning largely determines action, communication meaning becomes the source of social power by framing the human mind. (p. 136)

It is through framing that political actor shape the texts that influence or prime the agendas and considerations that people think about... Because the best succinct definition of power is the ability to get others to do what one wants (Nagel, 1975) “telling people what to think about” is how one exerts political influence in non-coercive political systems (and to a lesser extent in coercive ones). (Entman, 2007: 165) (p. 160)

Media framing represent a multilayered process that begins with a negotiation between key political actors or interest groups and the media before reaching citizens’ minds. (p. 161)
Cascading network activation

Source: adapted from Entman (2004: 10, figure 1.2). (p. 162)

The model, based on Entman’s (2004) research on the relationship between news framing, public opinion, and power in issues of US foreign policy, highlights the sequential interaction between different actors in a hierarchy of influence that combines the mechanisms of agenda-setting, priming, framing, and indexing in a single process characterized by the asymmetrical relationships between the actors tempered by feedback loops. Statements and stories generated at the top of the political hierarchy (high-ranking administration officials) more often than not initiate national and international political news stories. There are two main reasons for this: they are the holders of privileged information and their policy choices are the ones with the greatest likelihood of generating consequences (for example, decisions between war and peace in certain cases). The agenda-setting process is filtered by second-tier political elites or first-tier foreign elites, until reaching the media which provide the frames to the public on the basis of messages received from the political elites. Frames spread through the media and interpersonal networks and are activated in people’s minds. But the public also reacts by influencing the media, either with their comments or simply with their level of attention, as measured by media audiences. (p. 163)

It is important to note that news frames, once constructed, feed back to the political elites. For instance, once the “war on terror” frame became well established in the media, it was highly risky for the second-tier political elites to counteract it with their statements and votes. (p. 163)

Best et al. (2005) have shown that individuals who are dissatisfied with the dominant frame in their own country seek out confirmatory information (usually via Internet) from foreign
media sources. Thus, cascading activation works within specific polity systems and in relation to specific media environments. The global networks of news media offers the public an alternative when framing in one particular media context fails to win acceptance or subdue resistance. Indeed, media framing is not an irresistible determination of people’s perceptions and behavior. As important as it is to unveil the mechanism by which social actors influence human minds through the media, it is equally essential to emphasize the capacity of the same minds to respond to alternative frames from different sources or to switch off the reception of news that does not correspond to their way of thinking. (p. 165)

People tend to believe what they want to believe. (p. 167)

Partisan media versus mainstream media. However, both are dominated by business considerations. (p. 174)

Misinformation has been shown to largely determine support for the war. (p 188)

Dissent among the political elites diversified the agendas proposed to the media. Citizen journalism and the Internet broke through the dominant frames that had constrained information. (p. 188)

Yet, the most fundamental transformation throughout the whole process took place in people’s minds. (...) However, the issue remains that the later the public breaks through the frames of misinformation, the more the actions of mystifying elites result in destruction and pain “when the press fails” (Bennett et al., 2007). (p. 189)

Politics is the process of allocation of power in the institutions of the state. As I have argued and documented in this book, power relationships are largely based on the shaping of the human mind by the construction of meaning through image-making. Remember: ideas are images (visual or not) in or brain. For society at large, as distinct from a given individual, image-making is played out in the realm of socialized communication. In contemporary society, everywhere in the world, the media are the decisive means of communication. (p. 193)

Media politics is the conduct of politics in and by the media. In this chapter, I will try to show that, in our historical context, politics is primarily media politics. (p. 193)

People rely largely on the mass media to obtain most of their politically relevant information and, in spite of the growing importance of Internet, television and radio remains the most trusted sources of political news (Paniagua, 2006; Eurobarometer, 2007; Public Opinion Foundation, 2007; Pew, 2008c). The reason is obvious: if you see it, it must be true, as television news editors know only too well (Hart, 1999).28 (p. 195)

28 According to the Eurobarometer (2007: 54), more Europeans express trust in radio (66%) and television (56%) than in written press (47%) or Internet (35%). (p. 196)

One important observation concerning access is that the analysis presented do far refers exclusively to media of mass communication. Yet, I have emphasized in Chapter 2 the growing significance of mass self-communication on reaching people’s minds. In this case, traditional forms of access control are not applicable. Anyone can upload a video to the
Internet, write a blog, start a chat forum, or create a gigantic e-mail list. Access in this case is the rule; blocking Internet access is the exception. The Internet and mass media are two distinct, albeit related, platforms of communication that share a key common feature in the construction of the political field: in both cases the process of communication is shaped by the message. (p. 204)

It is the combination of polling and social data analysis that provides an interpretation of the trends in real time and enhances the opportunity to modify unfavorable evolution by acting on latent attitudes through new rounds of targeted messages differentiated for each social category (Hollihan, 2008). The construction of databases has another direct, operational effect on political strategies. Data can be calculated for each electoral precinct, thus offering a political geography of choices that allows personalized political propaganda through automated or live phone calls to the homes of prospective voters, direct e-mailing, and canvassing, as I will discuss below while analyzing political campaigns. (p. 211)

That this sophisticated form of political marketing is a derivative of commercial marketing is a clear indication of the rise of the citizen-consumer as a new persona in public life. In fact, politicians and businesses use the same databases because there is an active commerce of data-selling which originated from the use of massive computer power applied to processing data from government and academic sources with the huge collection of data resulting from the invasion of privacy by credit-card companies, telecommunication companies, and Internet companies selling information about those of their customers (the majority) who, unaware of the fine print in their contracts, do not opt out of the companies' policy of selling their customers' data. (p. 211)

...adaptation of corporate marketing techniques to American political campaigning. (p. 212)

...the evolution of political practice in the early years of the Information Age. (p. 212)

Why do parties, whose basic media advertising, campaigns, and management needs are satisfied by public funding, still need to tap into private donors? (…) However, why do the parties need to access this extra cash outside the legal system? Because they need to spend the funds flexibly and confidentially. Flexibly, because to be innovative in politics requires spending in areas and on projects that escape the definition of political activity in the strict regulatory terms of electoral commissions. Confidentially, because some decisive political operations outside campaign periods (for example, illegal fundraising, spying, fabricating scandals against the opponent, bribing journalists, paying blackmail, and the like) require substantial underground funding. (p. 223)

Interaction between governments, corporate business, and media companies. (P. 224)

REGULAMENTAÇÃO DA REDE GLOBAL: GRUPOS DE MÍDIA, MERCADO E GOVERNOS

Como a regulamentação se torna coadjuvante da relação existente entre os interesses dos governos, da mídia e do mercado.

This is because historically, before the 1990s, Italy's three government television channels (those belonging to the RAI, the public corporation) were assigned to the three major
political families, in decreasing order of importance: the Christian Democrats (RAI Uno), the Communists in their sequential reincarnations (RAI Due), and the Socialists (RAI Tre). (p. 224)

Furthermore, candidates now make use of the Internet to coordinate activities, provide campaign updates, and receive input from concerned citizen. Forums of debate and networks of information on the Internet have become essential organizational tools for contemporary campaign politics. (p. 230)

The Internet is a key source of information for younger segments of the population, and because young voters represent the main basis for innovative, proactive political projects (regardless of their ideology), the role of Internet communication in supporting political change becomes decisive. However, the main sources of political news on the Internet are the web sites of mainstream mass media (e.g., MSBNC, 26%; CNN, 23%), as well as web sites such as Yahoo! News and Google News, which link to other mainstream media, and this holds true for younger citizens, although MySpace accounts for 8 percent and YouTube for 6 percent of their online political news, and “others” account for 20 percent (Pew, 2008c: 7). (p. 232)

It is the interaction between mainstream media and the Internet that characterizes media politics in the digital age. (p. 234)

This is to say that, well before the advent of the network society, scandal politics was a critical feature in determining power relationships and institutional change. Indeed, anywhere we look into the history of societies around the world, the politics of scandal is a more rooted and typical form of power struggle than the conduct of orderly political competition as per the rules of the state. And yet, if it is true that nothing is new under the sun, it is also true that formally similar processes take new shapes and new meaning with the transformation of cultural, political, and communication contexts. The specificity of scandals politics in the network society, and its centrality in media politics, is the object of this section. (p. 242)

The ability to directly access mass communication platforms via mass self-communication platforms feeds a vast ocean of rumors and conspiracy theories. It also opens up the possibility for anyone to expose the improper or unlawful behavior of politicians, often with audiovisual support on YouTube or other platforms. (p. 248)

Tumbler (2004) considers the weakening of party identification and the decline of partisanship to the source of the rise of scandal politics, with a corresponding rise in a “culture of promotionalism” in which politicians, governments, and corporations promote their own interests over the interests of the collective (Tumbler, 2004: 1122). (p. 248)

Scandal politics is inseparable from media politics. First, because it is through the media (including, of course, the means of mass self-communication) that scandals are revealed and disseminated to society at large. (p. 249)

Because media politics is the politics of the Informational Age, scandal politics is the instrument of choice to engage in the political struggles of our time. (p. 250)
The state remains a critical actor in defining power relationships through communication networks. While we have analyzed the complexity of the interaction between media and politics, we should not overlook the oldest and most direct form of media politics: propaganda and control. This is: (a) the fabrication and diffusion of messages that distort facts and induce misinformation for the purpose of advancing government interests; and (b) the censorship of any message deemed to undermine these interests, if necessary by criminalizing unhindered communication and prosecuting the messenger. The extent and forms of government control over communication networks vary according to the legal and social environment in which a given state operates. Thus, I will analyze three distinct contexts in which the state exercises control of communication following different procedures adjusted to its rules of engagement with society at large: the United States, Russia, and China. (p. 264)

Cases of direct US government intervention in media reporting, both in America and in the world, are too numerous to be detailed here, but they constitute a pattern. Thus, the Bush administration hired actors to pose as journalists. It produced mock news bulletins (Video News Releases referred to as VNRs) to promote its view of the Iraq War. (p. 267)

These propaganda interventions are not unusual. They are justified by the enactors on behalf of the superior interest of the country and, when necessary, of democracy in the world. In analytical terms, what is relevant to emphasize is the awareness by the American state that the battle over information, the construction of public opinion through the media, is the necessary condition to obtain support for its actions. (p. 267)

The experience of the Vietnam War showed that this support is the most important condition for the exercise of American power. General Paul Vallely, an analyst with Fox News until 2007, and a specialist in psychological warfare, wrote a paper in 1980 blaming American media for the defeat in the Vietnam War. According to The New York Time’s Bastow, Vallely wrote that “We lost the war – not because we were outfought, but because we were Psyoped” (influenciados, persuadidos), and went on to propose psychological strategies for future wars aimed at domestic opinion, which he termed a “MindWar” strategy centered on television and radio networks (Bastow, 2008: A1). This is why, in the legal environment of the United States, in which state power to censor is limited, the control of information usually takes the form of generally messages and placing them with credible messengers who, willingly or not, convey untruth to an increasingly mystified audience. (p. 267)

Other institutional and cultural contexts appear more prone to direct government control of the media. Indeed, this is the case for most countries in the world. Governments tend to combine various strategies: political control over public media (often the most influential); government pressure on media owners; legislation empowering government control over all forms of communication; and, if everything else fails, personalized intimidation of journalists and bloggers. This is critical in the attempts to control internet-based communication in countries in which the state is the dominant instance of society. To explore strategies of direct government control of communication networks, I will analyze processes in two
countries that are particularly relevant for our understanding because of their pivotal role in the world and because of their explicit emphasis on controlling communication in the Internet Age: Russia and China. (p. 268)

The Russian state in democratic transition never forgot the fundamental lessons of its Soviet past: information is power and control of communication is the lever for keeping power. But, of course, the situation changed after the peaceful democratic transition that ended the Communist regime. Russia was now under the rule of law, and the law was under the rule of the market. (p. 268)

Self-censorship is the rule. (p. 270)

While corporate oversight and bureaucratic harassment are the main mechanism of control over the media, the Russian government also counts on a wide range of legal tools, aimed at both the media and Internet communication. In principle, censorship is forbidden, but a number of laws and decrees provide for exceptions to protect national security and to fight against cybercrime. Particularly relevant are the 1996 Sorm 1 and 1998 Sorm 2 laws authorizing FSB, the security agency, to monitor communications; (p. 270)

However, as in the rest of the world, the most important forms of control over the media concern the network infrastructure and programming content. (p. 272)

...warns that “television is training people to not think about which party is in Parliament, about which laws are being passed, about who will be in charge tomorrow” (quoted in Levy, 2007). (p. 273)

In sum: rather than political censorship, in a situation of direct and indirect control over the media, and of majority support for the presidency, self-censorship largely accounts for state control of Russian media. (p. 274)

Moreover, the global nature of the Internet, and the relative openness of its networks, represent a major challenge for a state historically obsessed with the control of information. The Russian state’s first reaction, when observing the fast diffusion of the Internet, was to arm itself with the legal and technical means to control the net. As mentioned above, the Sorm 1 (1996) and Sorm 2 (1998) laws provided the ground for surveillance of the Internet, and instructed the Internet service providers to install a device in their servers, at their expense, to enable the FSB to track email, financial transactions, and online interactions in general. In 2000, a new directive was incorporated to Sorm 2 to include the surveillance of wired and wireless telephone communications, while updating controls over the Internet. The justification in every case is the fight against crime and cybercrime. While there is a provision for judicial control of surveillance, it is usually disregarded. In 2008, at the time of writing, the Duma was debating a “Model Law on the Internet” which, according to reports in the news portal lenta.ru, “will define the system of government support for the Internet, designate participants in the process of regulation the Internet as well as their functions when regulating and define the guidelines designating places and times of the performance of legally significant actions upon the use of the Internet.” In reality, Russian laws do not censor content on the Internet. They simply allow surveillance to enforce in cyberspace
whatever laws and decrees exist on any domain of activity, including national security laws, property laws, anti-pornographic decrees, anti-libel laws, and laws banning racist and anti-Semitic propaganda, although they are rarely enforced. (p. 275)

In spite of limited government action against Internet communication, it appears that the Russian government is bracing itself for a battle in cyberspace, using methods similar to those that have worked so well with the media. First: creating a legal environment in which surveillance is legal and enacted. Second: spreading intimidation through publicized exemplary punishments. Third: recruiting Internet service providers and webmasters into surveillance activities, by making them responsible for punishable content on their web sites. Fourth: using state-owned companies to buy popular web sites to make sure that their managers keep political matters under control. Thus, RuTube, the equivalent of YouTube, created in December 2006, with 300,000 users a day, was acquired by Gazprom Media in March 2008. Gazprom Media is planning to invest heavily in Internet media. And fifth, and foremost, the state is responding to the challenge of free communication networks by intervening in discussions and postings on the Internet through hired hands, or government moles posing as independent bloggers, and issue that was brought up in the online Russian forum of The New York Times in 2008. (p. 276)

There is no censorship in Live Journal... They are not that stupid in the Kremlin. They have seen that the Chinese or Vietnamese practice of censoring the Internet does not bring any good. They prefer a different method, trying to saturate the Russian net with their own propaganda sites and intervening with their own bloggers on the web. (p. 276)

Neutralidade na rede: ninguém pode ter privilégio de tráfego na rede ou de filtragem (censura)

Quais os limites da neutralidade na rede – censura, identidade cultural dos povos, regimes de governo diferentes.

Controlar a comunicação na rede

Ou regulamentar a comunicação na rede

Como as filtragens se processam através da rede e como as regulamentações podem fazer com que elas não avancem em prol da neutralidade na rede.

When the Internet diffused in China in the early 2000s, the Internet Information Management Bureau was added to the group, as were all relevant agencies and commissions directing the building and management of communication networks. (p. 278)

In addition, the party’s traditional Propaganda Department strengthened its Power and perfected its methods, a process that began by renaming the department the Publicity Department, a term considered more professional than “propaganda”. This department covers all areas of potential diffusion of ideas and information in China, including, in addition to the media, cultural institutions, universities, and any form of organized ideological or political expression. It extends its activities to day-to-day of media operations, television, radio, print press, news agencies, books, and the Internet. (p. 279)
However, as Yuezhi Zhao and other analysts have observed, the controlling process is more complex than it appears at first sight. It is unthinkable that in the most populated country in the world, and in a highly complex society, party committees could suppress any deviation in the elaboration and diffusion of media messages, particularly when, in most matters, directives cannot be precise to the smallest detail. And details matter, particularly in local contexts. This is why its distributed structure is the critical mechanism through which communication control operates. Political appointees closely surveil the entire media system in a cascade of controls that ultimately places responsibility on the shoulders of the immediate supervisor in charge of the production and distribution of each media message, so that generalized self-censorship is the rule. (p. 279)

Individual mistakes have a price. Historically, journalists would lose their jobs and, depending on the seriousness of their error, would be dealt with by the political police or the party’s re-education programs. (p. 279)

However, while the Chinese model of control of traditional media is both comprehensive and reasonably effective, the issue of the feasibility of extrapolation this model to the Internet arise. Indeed, this is a question that dominates the debate about the true freedom of the Internet throughout the world. How contradictory is, in Qiu’s (2004) terms, the diffusion of technologies of freedom in a statist society? Because the actuality of this diffusion exists: while in 2007, there were 210 million Internet users in China, compared to 216 million in the US, according to government statistics in July 2008, there were 253 million Internet users in China, which now makes it the country with the highest number of Internet users in the world (CNNIC, 2008). The Chinese government has fully embraced the Internet as a business, as well as an educational, cultural, and propaganda tool. For instance, on June 25, 2008, President Hu Jintao interacted with netizens for four minutes on the People’s Net, which belongs to the Xinhua News Agency, and emphasized the importance of the Internet as a tool of democracy, while calling on government officials to engage in similar dialogues with citizens. Yet, the Chinese government, like many governments in the world, is unyielding (inflexível) in its long-standing practice of surveilling content, blocking unwanted messages, and punishing the messengers accordingly. But how can the government exercise control over such a gigantic, decentralized network of communication, connected to global networks, in which Chinese users spend over two billion hours a week? (p. 281)

Advanced Internet and tracking were implemented, and the most sophisticated blocking system in the world (The Golden Shield Project) was contracted to Cisco, although its expected deployment is still to be completed at the time of writing in mid-2008. (p. 282)

And yet, the technical effectiveness of controls is questionable. This is because, as a last resort, surveillance mechanisms are based on automated content analysis systems that track key words. (p. 282)

Although the censorship regime tries to block, filter, and track, most determined users in China can access outlawed information via encrypted messages, FTP, and most recently, peer-to-peer technologies. (p. 283)
This is why the most effective system of controlling the Internet in China is the one that reproduces the time-tested method used over the years to control the media: the cascading hierarchy of surveillance that ultimately induces self-censorship at all levels, and makes the culprit pay at each level when significant failure of control is detected (Dong, 2008b). Thus, the property of Internet access providers is in the hands of government. Internet service providers are licensed, and are liable for the diffusion of any undue content over the Internet. Internet content providers are also liable, and additionally must attend government-training sessions and obtain a certificate to operate their service. (p. 284)

There follows a mixture of complicity and self-censorship that makes the Internet life livable for the overwhelming majority of Internet users, those who do not have a political agenda, even if they sometimes interact about politics. (p. 284)

In her study on “The actual effectiveness of Internet control in China,” Dong (2008b) observed online interaction in two Chinese forums for several weeks in the spring of 2008, recording comments, including those exchanged with the webmasters. (p. 284)

And so, state power, in its most traditional manifestation, that is manipulation and control, is pervasive in the media and the Internet throughout the world. It constitutes yet another layer of media politics aimed at influencing behavior by constructing meaning. But it does not cancel the processes of power-making examined in this chapter. In fact, scandal politics often relates to the capacity of the state itself, and not just of political actors, to fabricate, reveal or black damaging information regarding its opponents. In some instances, the conflicts within the state are fought over the media, at times through the use of scandal politics. Thus, there are multiple forms of media politics, but they all share two fundamental features: they are aimed at power-making by shaping the public mind; and they contribute to the crisis of political legitimacy that is shaking the institutional foundations of our societies. (p. 285)

Yet, since democracy is essentially procedural, as I argued in Chapter I, if the process of power allocation in state institutions and the management of governing institutions can be modified by extra-procedural actions in favor of specific interest groups or individuals, there is no reason why citizens should respect the orderly delegation of power to their rulers. What follows is a crisis of legitimacy: that is, a widespread lack of belief in the right of political leaders to make decisions on behalf of citizens for the well-being of society at large. (p. 288)

Furthermore, while corruption may not have increased substantially in recent history (the opposite is more likely), what has increased is the publicity of corruption, the perception of corruption, and the impact of such perception on political trust. (p. 288)

Therefore, the connection between exposure to political corruption and the decline of political trust can be directly related to the dominance of media politics and the politics of scandal in the conduct of public affairs. (p. 289)

The current trend is to refer to “media malaise” (mal) as negative coverage on television that is mimicked across mediums. (p. 290)
Media politics and scandal politics contribute to the worldwide crisis of political legitimacy but a decline in political trust is not tantamount to a decline in political participation. (p. 295)

Indeed, democracy as an historical practice, in contrast to democracy as a concept of political philosophy, is contextual. In the early twenty-first century, in a globally interdependent world, democracy is usually understood as the form of government resulting from the will of citizens choosing between competitive candidacies in relatively free elections held at mandated intervals of time under judicial control. (p. 296)

The real question is: how democratic are the self-proclaimed democracies, and how stable are their institutions when confronted with the growing gap between their constitutional rules and the beliefs of their citizens? It is from this vantage point that I will assess the potential crisis of democracy as it relates to media politics. (p. 296)

To a large extent, the crisis of legitimacy and its consequences for democratic practice is related to the crisis of the nation-state in the global network society, as a result of the contradictory processes of globalization and identification, as analyzed in Chapter 1. Since modern representative democracy was established in the realm of the nation-state by constructing individual citizens as legally based political subjects, the efficiency and legitimacy of the state have been diminished by its inability to control global networks of wealth, power, and information, while its representation is blurred by the rise of identity-based cultural subjects. Attempts to reassert the power of the nation-state by the traditional means of the use of force, particularly intense in the post-9/11 period, quickly found the limits of global interdependency and culturally based counter-domination strategies. The gradual building of global governance networks still remains dependent on national political institutions in interaction with local and global civil society. (p. 297)

Yet, there is another, less apparent, form of crisis. If accept the idea that the critical form of power-making takes place through the shaping of the human mind, and that this process is largely dependent on communication, and ultimately on media politics, then the practice of democracy is called into question when there is a systemic disassociation between communication power and representative power. In other words, if the formal procedures of political representation are dependent on the informal allocation of communication power in the multimedia system, there is no equal opportunity for actors, values, and interests to operate the actual mechanisms of power allocation in the political system. It follows that the most important crisis of democracy under the conditions of media politics is the confinement of democracy to the institutional realm in a society in which meaning is produced in the sphere of media. Democracy can only be reconstructed in the specific conditions of the network society if civil society, in its diversity, can break through the corporate, bureaucratic, and technological barriers of societal image-making. Interestingly enough, the same pervasive multimodal communication environment that encloses the political mind in the media networks may provide a medium for the diverse expression of alternative messages in the age of mass self-communication. Is this really so? Or is this another utopia that could transform into dystopia when placed under the lens of scholarly scrutiny? The following chapter investigates the issue. (p. 298)
And changes in individual behavior and collective action gradually, but surely, impact and modify norms and institutions that structure social practices. However, institutions are crystallizations of social practices of prior moments in history, and these social practices are rooted in power relationships. Power relationships are embedded in institutions of all sorts. (p. 299)

Not all individuals engage in the process of social change, but throughout history there are always individuals who do, thus becoming social actors. The others are “free-riders” as the theory would put it. Or, in my own terminology, selfish parasites of history-making. (p. 300)

Public space is the space of societal, meaningful interaction where ideas and values are formed, conveyed, supported, and resisted; space that ultimately becomes a training ground for action and reaction. This is why, throughout history, the control of socialized communication by ideological and political authorities, and by the wealthy, was a key source of social power (...). This is now the case in the network society, more so than ever before. In this book, I hope to have shown how multimodal communication networks constitute, by and large, the public space in the network society. And so, different forms of control and manipulation of messages and communication in the public space are at the heart of power-making, as documented in Chapters 3 and 4. (p. 301)

Yet, the public space is a contested terrain, however biased (inclinado) toward the interests of the builders and caretakers of this space. Without contesting the images created and projected in the public space by the powers that be, individual minds cannot reconstruct a new public mind, and so societies would be trapped in an endless process of cultural reproduction, walling off innovation, alternative projects, and ultimately social change. (p. 302)

In sum: in the network society, the battle of images and frames, at the source of the battle for minds and souls, takes place in multimedia communication networks. These networks are programmed by the power relationships embedded within the networks, as analyzed in Chapter 4. Therefore, the process of social change requires the reprogramming of the communication networks in terms of their cultural codes and in terms of the implicit social and political values and interests that they convey. It is not an easy task. Precisely because they are multimodal, diversified, and pervasive (difuso, difundido), communication networks are able to include and enclose cultural diversity and a multiplicity of messages to a much greater extent than any other public space in history. Thus, the public mind is captured in programmed communication networks, limiting the impact of autonomous expressions outside the networks. But in a world marked by the rise of mass-self communication, social movements and insurgent politics have the chance to enter the public space from multiple sources. By using both horizontal communication networks and mainstream media to convey their images and messages, they increase their chances of enacting social and political change – even if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources, or symbolic legitimacy. However, their accrued power as alternative messengers comes with a servitude (servidão): they must adapt to the language of the media and to the formats of interaction in the communication networks. On balance, the rise of networks of mass self-communication offers greater chances for autonomy. However,
for this autonomy to exist, social actors must assert the right to mass self-communication by preserving freedom and fairness in the deployment and management of the networked infrastructure of communication and in the practice of the multimedia industries. Liberty, and ultimately social change, become entwined with the institutional and organizational operation of communication networks. Communication politics becomes dependent upon the politics of communication. (p. 302)

The collective effort of environmental activists and scientists, who used the media to change the opinion of the public and influence decision-makers, prompted business to change its attitude, or at least the public image it would like to project. This is precisely what epitomizes the role of social movements in transforming the culture of society, in this case the culture of nature. (p. 305)

In sum: the data show that from the late 1980s to the late 2000s there has been a dramatic shift in the world’s public opinion in terms of global warming awareness and concern regarding its potential consequences. Global warming, once an obscure scientific issue, has come to the forefront of public debate. Why and how? What happened between 1988 and 2008? Who were the actors and what were the communication processes that brought people and institutions around the world to face the crisis of global warming? (p. 315)

It was the networking between the scientific community, environmental activists, and celebrities that brought the issue to the media, and communicated it to the public at large via multimedia networks. (p. 321)

As I will discuss below, environmental groups/campaigns often use a celebrity to gain more news attention. Thrall et al. (2008) argue that celebrities are not only used to break into and attract news media attention, but also to break into the entertainment media world, since viewers increasingly turn to entertainment media for their news. Thus environmental groups strategically use entertainment venues as channels to communicate their messages, all of which is made easier with new technology and digital networks. Half of the environmental groups studied by Thrall et al. (2008) used a form of entertainment to disseminate their message, and tactics included staging concerts, inserting messages into entertainment broadcasts, and streaming videos with celebrity interviews. The most well-known example of this type of environmental entertainment advocacy is Live Earth, the concert series sponsored by Al Gore and environmental groups to combat climate change (see below). (p. 323)

There has been a shift in the tactics of environmental organizations from broadcasting to narrowcasting to communicate their message. Approaches to narrowcasting include: creating web sites, setting up channels on YouTube, establishing pages on social networking sites, and using mobile phones to send SMSs. (p. 323)

As I will develop in the next section of this chapter, social movements addressing global issues are transnational in scope and depend on the Internet for the diffusion of information, communication, and coordination. (p. 325)
While celebrities have historically supported political and ethical campaigns, today's celebrity activists have more incentive to adopt global causes and are more likely to be successful in pushing the agenda (Drezner, 2007). This has less to do with celebrities’ fame and more to do with how people consume information. For example, an increasing number of Americans get their information about world politics from soft-news shows, which celebrities dominate (such as Entertainment Tonight, Access Hollywood, and The Daily Show). (p. 327)

In sum: celebrities of various origins seem to have converged around the one common cause that appears to transcend partisan politics (although it does not) to use their reputation and ascendance to call people to the defense of our livability on the planet. To do so, they create events, a potent form of media politics. (p. 331)

Since the late 1990s, a multifaceted, globally networked movement has challenged the inevitability and orientation of corporate globalization, understood as the priority given to markets over societies in the process of asymmetrical liberalization of markets around the world under the guidance of the so-called Washington consensus, enacted by G-8 club, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other International Institutions (Stiglitz, 2002). (p. 339)

Social movements: the Internet articulates the local with the global.

And yet, we know, and Juris reminds us forcefully, that all technologies can be used for oppression as much as for liberation, and the networks connect and disconnect, include and exclude, depending in their programs and on their configuration. (p. 346)

However, the simple fact that the movement itself, or at least a significant component of the movement, in Barcelona and elsewhere, is seizing the new technological medium to claim the historical possibility of new democratic forms of living together, without submitting to structures of domination, is a project in itself. Utopian, certainly. But utopias are not chimeras. They are mental constructions that by their existence inspire action and change reality. By advocating the liberating power of electronic networks of communication, the networked movement against imposed globalization opens up new horizons of possibility in the old dilemma between individual freedom and societal governance. (p. 346)

The existence of 3.5 billion mobile-phone subscribers in 2008 means that it is possible to reach out and diffuse a message anywhere, in real time. (p. 347)

In less dramatic terms, mobile phones have become a key component in the organization and mobilization of social protests around the world (…) (p. 349)

But perhaps the movement that best exemplifies the new relationship between communication control and communication autonomy at the root of current forms of protest and resistance is the March 2004 mobilization in Spain, when spontaneous indignation against lies of the government concerning al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack in Madrid ignited a movement that resulted in the electoral defeat of Prime Minister Aznar, one of the staunchest supporters of the policies of President Bush. This is one movement in which the use of mobile-phone networks played a decisive role, as I will document below. (p. 349)
Novas tecnologias (telefones móveis e Internet) fornecem uma alternativa para o público expressar sua opinião acerca da agenda da mídia e também promover novos “frames” ou pontos de vistas, além daqueles que a grande mídia oferece. Esses novos “frames” fornecidos pela mobilização das popular podem ganhar a visibilidade necessária capaz de atingirem a grande mídia e forçarem governantes a se explicarem perante a sociedade.

But as we learn from the social history of technology, the relevance of a given technology, and its acceptance by people at large, do not result from the technology itself, but from the appropriation of the technology by individuals and collectives to fit their needs and their culture. (p. 362)

(...) two major trends define the basic cultural patterns of the global network society through their interaction: networked individualism and communalism. (p. 362)

There are also social movements that result from the crossing of the two cultural patterns: networked individualism and communalism. These are movements that emerge from networks of individuals reacting to perceived oppression, and then transforming their shared protest into a community of practice, their practice being resistance. So, networks of individuals become insurgent communities. (p. 363)

The case studies presented in this chapter are windows opening on the landscape of social change in our time. Acting on the cultural codes that frame minds, social movements create the possibility of producing another world, in contrast with the reproduction of norms and disciplines embedded in society’s institutions. By bringing new information, new practices, and new actors into the political system, political insurgents challenge the inevitability of politics as usual and regenerate the roots of our fledgling democracy. In both instances, they alter existing power relationships and introduce new sources of decision-making about who gets what and what is the meaning of what we get. (p. 412)

Enacting social change in the network society proceeds by reprogramming the communication networks that constitute the symbolic environment for image manipulation and information processing in our minds, the ultimate determinants of individual and collective practices. Creating new content and new forms in the networks that connect minds and their communicative environments is tantamount to rewiring our minds. (p. 412)

The greater the autonomy of the communicating subjects vis-à-vis the controllers of societal communication nodes, the higher the chances for the introduction of messages challenging dominant values and interests in communication networks. This is why the rise of mass self-communication, as analyzed in Chapter 2, provides new opportunities for social change in a society that is organized, in all domains of activity, around a meta-network of electronic communication networks (p. 413)

Unless the elites permanently withdraw to an invisible space, their actions are exposed to the decentralized surveillance of millions of eyes: we are all now potential paparazzi. (p. 413)

All of these processes of social change, in values and in politics, have found a significant lever in the means offered by the network of mass self-communication. It is through these networks that people at large can be reached, and the mainstream media, unable to ignore
the buzzing world of multiple communication channels surrounding them, may be compelled to broaden the range of their messages. (p. 414)

However, the technologies of freedom are not free. Governments, parties, corporations, interest groups, churches, gangsters, and power apparatuses of every possible origin and kind have made it their priority to harness the potential of mass self-communication in the service of their specific interests. (p. 414)

History-making is not pre-scripted (…) (p. 414)

The analyses presented in this book, provided, in my view, tentative empirical support for a number of hypotheses concerning the nature of power in the network society. Power is primarily exercised by the construction of meaning in the human mind through processes of communication enacted in global/local multimedia networks of mass communication, including mass self-communication. Although theories of power and historical observation point to the decisive importance of the state’s monopoly of violence as a source of social power, I argue that the ability to successfully engage in violence or intimidation requires the framing of individual and collective minds. For instance, the Iraq War was made possible by the campaign of misinformation conducted under the frame of the “war on terror” by the Bush administration to conquer the minds of American as a way to conquer Iraq and retain the White House. (p. 416)

The smooth functioning of society’s institutions does not result from their judicial and policing capacity to force citizens into compliance. In fact, in societies where institutions become dysfunctional because of their deep penetration by criminal networks, the police become a threat to law-abiding citizens who organize their lives as far as possible from the corridors of the state. How people think about the institutions under which they live, and how they relate to the culture of their economy and society, define whose power can be exercised and how it can be exercised. (p. 416)

The process of constructing meaning operates in a cultural context that simultaneously global and local, and is characterized by a great of diversity. There is, however, one feature common to all processes of symbolic construction: they are largely dependent on the messages and frames created, formatted, and diffused in multimedia communication networks. Although each individual human mind constructs its own meaning by interpreting the communicated materials on its own terms, this mental processing is conditioned by the communication environment. (p. 417)

Therefore, if power relationships are constructed largely in the human mind, and if the construction of meaning in the human mind is primarily dependent on the flows of information and images processed in the communication networks, it would be logical to conclude that power resides in the communication networks and in their corporate owners. (p. 417)

This conclusion may be logical, but it is empirically wrong. Because while communication networks are certainly the messengers, they are not the message. The medium is not the message, although it conditions the format and distribution of the message. The message is the message, and the sender of the message is at the source of the construction of meaning. In
fact, it is one of the terms of this construction. The other is the receiving mind, both individual and collective. By collective mind, I mean the cultural context in which the message is received. (p. 418)

Referring to the conceptualization proposed in Chapter 1, the multimedia communication networks jointly exercise network power over the messages they convey because messages must adapt to the common protocols of communication (or standards, in Grewal’s [2008] formulation) embodied in the structure and management of the networks. However, while standardized forms of mass communication may shape minds by their formatting of the messages (for instance, news as infotainment), in the world of mass self-communication the diversity of formats is the rule. Thus, apparently, standards are diminished as a source of network power. However, digitization operates as a protocol of communication. In principle, everything can be digitized, so it does not appear that this standard inhibits the message. Yet, it does have an opposite, significant effect: It amplifies the diffusion of the message beyond anyone’s control. Digitization is tantamount to potential viral diffusion throughout the global networks of communication. This is highly positive if you do want to diffuse the message, but devastating if you do not want to diffuse the message (if, say, the message is a video recording of your wrongdoing). In this case, the network power exercised by digital networks assumes a new form: the removal of control over message distribution. This is in contrast with the traditional network power of the mass media which reformats the message to be suitable for the audience in accordance with corporate strategy. (p. 418)

Yet, multimedia networks, as structures of communication, do not hold networking power, networked power, or network-making power, by themselves. They depend on the decisions and instructions of their programmers. In my conceptual framework (see Chapter 1), networking power consists of the capacity of letting a medium or a message enter the network through gatekeeping procedures. Those in charge of the operations of each communication network are the gatekeepers, and so they exercise networking power by blocking or allowing access to media outlets and/or to messages that are conveyed to the network. I call it gatekeeping the nodes and gatekeeping the messages. The rise of mass self-communication has deeply modified the gatekeeping capacity of the programmers of mass communication. Anything that reaches the Internet may reach the world at large. However, gatekeeping still yields considerable networking power because most socialized communication is still processed through the mass media, and the most popular information web sites are those of the mainstream media because of the importance of branding in the source of the message. Furthermore, government control over the Internet and the attempts of corporate business to enclose telecommunication networks in their privately owned “walled gardens” show the persistence of networking power in the hands of the gatekeepers. (p. 418)

Networked power, distinct from network power and from networking power, is the form of power exercised by certain nodes over other nodes within the network. In communication networks, this translates as the agenda-setting, managerial, and editorial decision-making power in the organizations that own and operate multimedia communication networks. In Chapters 3 and 4, I analyzed the multilayered structure of decision-making in the corporate media, albeit focusing on politically relevant information processing. I showed the complex interaction between different decision-makers of news production (the social actors that set
up the communication agenda, e.g., governments or social elites; owners of communication networks and their corporate sponsors, through the intermediation of advertising agencies; managers; editors; journalists; and an increasingly interactive audience). It is at each one of these levels that programmers exercise power. There are multiple programmers in each network. While there is a hierarchy in the capacity to program the network, it is the whole set of programmers who jointly decide on the network’s operations. Because they interact among themselves, as well as with the programmers of other communication networks, it can be said that programmers constitute a network themselves: a decision-making network to set up and manage the programs on the network. But their power is specific: it is geared to ensuring the fulfillment of the goals of the network, which is, primarily, to attract audience, regardless of whether the purpose of this goal is to maximize profits, or influence, or something else. The overarching goal of network management by the networked power of programmers is to constitute the programmed. The programmed are the subordinated subjects of the power-holders in the communication networks. However, the networked management of the communication networks operates under the conditions of a meta-program that has been designed by someone else from outside the network. This enigmatic “someone else” is the subject of the most determining form of power: network-making power. (419)

Network-making power is the capacity to set up and program a network, in this case a multimedia, mass communication network. This mainly refers to the owners and controllers of media corporations, be they businesses or the state. They are the ones who have the financial, legal, institutional, and technological means to organize and operate mass communication networks. And they are those who, in the last resort, decide the content and format of communication, according to the formula that will best accomplish the goals they assign to the network: profit-making, power-making, culture-making, or all of the above. But who are “they”? I may name a few names: Murdoch, Berlusconi, Bloomberg, and, if I introduce Internet business corporations, Sergey Brin, Larry Page, Jerry Yang, David Filo, and the like. (p. 420)

Moreover, the range of investments of these global multimedia business networks increases with new possibilities of interactive, multimodal communication, particularly the Internet and wireless communication networks. In this case, the programming of the networks is less about content than about format. The Internet only becomes profitable if people use it, and people would use it less if it lost its fundamental features: interactivity and unfettered communication, regardless of how surveyed it is. The expansion of Internet networks, and the development of Web 2.0 and Web 3.0, offer extraordinary business opportunities for the implementation of the strategy I call the commodification of freedom: enclosing the commons of free communication and selling people access to global communication networks in exchange for surrendering their privacy and becoming advertising targets. However, once in cyberspace, people may have all kinds of ideas, including challenging corporate power, dismantling government authority, and changing the cultural foundations of our aging/aching civilization. (p. 421)

The more corporations invest in expanding communication networks (benefiting from a hefty return), the more people build their own networks of mass self-communication, thus empowering themselves. Therefore, network-making power in the communication realms is characterized by the action of multimedia networks (including business and government) that
interact with networked users who both consume media products and create their own culture. Networks interact with networks in the shared process of network-making. (p. 421)

But where is power in all of this? If power is the relational capacity to impose the will and values of social actors over others, who are these social actors? I have shown how power is made through communication networks, how these networks operate, and how and by whom these communication networks are established and programmed. But whose power do these networks process? If the meta-programmers are the owners of the multimedia business networks, are they the power elite of the network society? It would be tempting to play with words and characterize the transformation of power in the network society as a shift from the ownership of the means of production to the ownership of the means of communication since, as some theorists propose, we have shifted from the production of goods to the production of culture. This is, indeed, an elegant proposition but it leaves us hanging in discourse without precise reference to the actual drama of power struggles in our world. (p. 421)

The owners of global multimedia corporate networks (themselves networks, but networks of people at the helm of their organization) are certainly among the power-holders of the network society because they program the decisive network: the meta-network of communication networks, the networks that process the ideational materials with which we fell, think, live, submit, and fight. Their relationship to the social actors over whom they exercise their power is also easy to identify: they transform humans into audience by selling us the images of our lives. So, they achieve their interest (money-making, influence-making) by designing the content of our culture according to their corporate strategies. This does not necessarily mean that they impose their values upon us (although they often do) because the effectiveness of the media depends on their adaptation to different cultural patterns and states of mind and to the differential evolution of each one of these patterns and moods. It means that the bottom line of what will be processed in the networks depends on what sells (or convinces, it the motive id politico-ideological), regardless of the congruity between what corporations want and what we want. There is consumer choice, but within a range of predefined products, and presupposing consumption rather than co-production. This is why the rise of mass self-communication, which increases the ability of us, the audience, to produce our own messages, potentially challenges corporate control of communication and may change power relationships in the communication sphere. However, for the long time being, there is an unequal competition between professionalized media production and our low-quality home videos and blog gossip. Corporate media have adapted to the digital world and are extending their range of products by customizing them for individual profiles. Since we are unable to reinvent Hollywood by ourselves, we use the Internet for social networking (usually through corporate platforms), while most cultural production is globally concentrated and individually targeted. The power relationship between multimedia corporate networks and society at large is centered around the shaping of cultural production according to the will, values, and interests of corporate owners and their sponsors. (p. 422)

However, the range of power relationships is much broader, and includes, particularly, political power relationships, which provide access to, and management of, the institutions of governance. In this book, I have documented that communication networks are essential to the construction of political power and counterpower. The owners of corporate
communication networks also provide the platform for the construction of meaning for other social actors. Thus, they exercise power through cultural production, and they exercise networking power over other actors by controlling access to communication networks; for example, vis-à-vis political actors who need access to communication to construct their power relationships with regard to the citizenry. However, in political power relationships, the meta-programmers, those who produce the message, are political actors. To be sure, political actors rely on the actors whose values and interests they represent (e.g., religious organizations, corporate businesses, the military-industrial complex). They articulate the diversity of interests supporting their project to maximize their autonomy as political actors while increasing their chances of seizing political power. But once in power, they are the programmers of political processes and policy-making. Their programs are diverse because different leaders and their coalitions vie for power in political competition shaped by the procedures of each political system. However, they share some fundamental protocols of communication that aim to preserve the stability of state domination under constitutional rules. So, the programs embedded in political institutions exercise network power over citizens and political actors. The judiciary exercises networking power by gatekeeping access to political competition both in terms of actors and procedures. And the political systems as a whole is based on networked power distributed at different levels of the relationship between the state and society. (p. 423)

I have shown in Chapter 3 and 4 that media politics is the fundamental mechanism by which access to political power and policy-making operates. Therefore, the programs embedded in multimedia networks shape and condition the implementation of the political networks’ programs. Yet, media owners are not those who design and determine political program. Neither are they passive transmitters of the programs’ instructions. They exercise gatekeeping power, and they format and distribute the political programs according to their specific interests as media organizations. Thus, media politics is not just politics in general, and it is not the politics of the media: it is the dynamic interface between political networks and media networks. I call the management of this interface between two or more networks, networking switching. The control of this switching capacity defines a fundamental form of power in the network society: switching power. I call the holders of switching power, the switchers. I shall illustrate this abstract, yet fundamental formulation with the findings of a case study of one significant switcher, Rupert Murdoch. (p. 423)

Communication networks are largely owned and managed by global multimedia corporate networks. Although states, and their controlled corporations, are part of these networks, the heart of global communication networks is connected to, and largely dependent on, corporations that are themselves dependent on financial investors and financial markets. This is the bottom line of multimedia business, as analyzed in Chapter 2. (p. 424)